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

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At a Meeting of the Chamber of Commerce of the WHITE SALT TRADE, held at Northwich, on Thursday, the 13th August, 1846, the following Resolutions were passed:—

"IT being highly desirable for the interests of the Salt Trade of this Country, that the Indian Markets (whose annual consumption is at least 250,000 to 300,000 tons) should be fairly opened for the admission of British Manufactured Salt, which can be supplied of a far purer quality, and at much lower rates, than that produced under the East India Company's system.

"Resolved, that each Salt Manufacturer in Cheshire and Worcestershire, be requested to use his personal interest, individually as well as collectively, to abolish a Monopoly so injurious to the interests of the Salt Trade of England.

"That, as the admission of British Salt into India intimately affects not only the price, but also the supply, of Bengal Sugars, and is likewise of the greatest importance to the Shipowners and Manufacturers of this Country, it is advisable that a Letter be drawn up and forwarded by the Chairman of the Salt Chamber of Commerce, to the Chairman of the Shipowners' Association in London and Liverpool,—the East India and China Association—the Manchester, Liverpool, Bristol, and Glasgow Chambers of Commerce,—requesting their aid and assistance, separately and collectively, as well as that of the individual Members of the various Chambers and Associations over which they preside, in order to abolish a Monopoly so fraught with mischief to the Manufacturing, Shipping, and Commercial interests of England, as well as so injurious to the moral, domestic, and political economy of the people of India. And in order that an accurate knowledge may generally be diffused of the working and effects of the Salt Monopoly in India, 150 copies of MR. D. C. AYLWIN'S Salt Pamphlet be forwarded to each of the above Gentlemen, with a request that they will distribute them amongst such Shipowners, Manufacturers, Sugar-refiners, and Merchants, as they may deem most interested in the Indian Trade, or most likely to take up and advocate this question.

"That, as it is desirable the Board of Control should be petitioned prior to applying to Parliament for redress, a deputation from the Salt Proprietors of England shall as soon as possible be formed; and that this Chamber be requested to place itself in communication with the Chairman of the Ship Owners' Association in London and Liverpool—the East India and China Associations—the Manchester, Liverpool, Bristol, and Glasgow Chambers of Commerce, to request their active co-operation in submitting to their various Chambers and Associations the propriety of uniting in one common body, to petition the Board of Control to abolish a monopoly which is equally prejudicial to the interests of all.

"That circular letters, with the above resolutions attached, be forwarded to each Member of the Salt Trade, with a request that, with as little delay as possible, a list may be furnished to the Chamber of Commerce of such individuals to whom each Member may wish a copy of Mr. Aylwin's Salt Pamphlet to be forwarded.

"That a General Meeting of the Salt Trade of England be called for Monday, 31st August, at the Angel Inn, Northwich, at One o'clock; and

"That Mr. Aylwin be respectfully requested to attend such Meeting."

W. WORTHINGTON, CHAIRMAN.

To W. WORTHINGTON, Esq.

CHESHIRE,

"CHAIRMAN OF THE SALT CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,"

AND

F. GREENSHIELDS, Esq.

(STOKE WORKS), WORCESTER.

8, Moorgate Street, London,
20*th July*, 1846.

My dear Sirs,

In selecting individuals, to whom I might not inappropriately inscribe a pamphlet, devoted to a consideration of the vast advantages accruing from the establishment of new markets for British Salt in the East, and the indirect extension of a demand for Manchester and other manufactures, I have had no hesitation in giving a preference to two gentlemen, whose high character, official position, and intimacy with the exertions already used to further the trade in question, so eminently qualify and entitle them to receive the dedication.

You are, I believe, aware of the attention which, for some considerable time past, I have, along with my friends, Messrs. Enthoven and Co. of London, devoted to the subject of the opening of the Indian Ports for the admission of British Salt; and also (from Messrs. Aylwin and Co., of Calcutta, having been, during the preceding twelvemonth, extensive consignees of this commodity) how interested my house is in the abolition of all obstructions to the free importation thereof—and it was partially in order to collect information on all such points as in any way, either directly or indirectly, bore upon this question, that induced me, last year, to leave England for Calcutta. This circumstance, combined with the intelligence I acquired through my native partner, Baboo Sumboochunder Doss, and also Messrs. Aylwin, Doss and Co., of "Mirzapore" (*which is the Great Central Depôt in Northern India for British Cotton Manufactures and Metals, as well as Native Produce*), has put me in possession of information, which I deem of sufficient importance to the commercial interests of this country, to induce me to embody and lay the results before my friends and constituents in England and India, as well as the general body of the Salt Manufacturers of this country.

The subject is one of deep interest and importance; and I feel I cannot be charged with over-rating its consequence, when the employment that the opening of the Salt Trade in India would afford to British "*labour*" and British Shipping, is considered; the extended markets that would be opened for the Cotton Manufactures of Manchester and Glasgow; the benefit that would result to the mass of the population, as well as to the Revenue of Bengal; and the intimate connection that exists between the Salt and "*Sugar*" Question in India; whether, I say, I consider the foregoing collectively or separately, I feel no apology is needed; as also, that nothing is required but firm combination in purpose, and prompt unanimity in action, to ensure the destruction of an injurious and oppressive monopoly, and the early formation of a new and lucrative trade, fruitful of the greatest advantage and interest to every one concerned in Salt, Sugar, Manufactures, and Shipping.

I have the honour to be,

My dear Sirs,

Very sincerely, your obedient servant,

D. C. Aylwin.

CHAPTER I.

HISTORY OF THE SALT TRADE IN INDIA.

At an early period of the East India Company's trade with India, a Firmaun was obtained from the Mogul emperor, whereby the Company's trade, in "whatever goods and merchandise their agents might bring or carry, by land or by water, in the ports, quarters and borders of the provinces," was wholly exempted from the payment of duties.

This privilege, at first confined to exports and imports, was confirmed in treaties with successive Subahdars, by which all goods of whatever description bought or sold by the Company's servants, or their Gomastahs (agents) were allowed to pass free. It was also stipulated that favour and encouragement should be shown to Gomastahs having a Perwaneh or Dustuck (permit, passport, or warrant under seal) signed by the Governor, or by any of the chiefs of the English factories.

At this time, it seems that the Company's servants, from the members of Government downwards, chiefly depended on the profits arising out of this privileged trade, in which SALT was always the principal article, for remuneration of their public services.

This exemption from duties naturally threw the whole private trade of the country into the hands of the Company's servants and their Gomastahs; and under cover of Dustucks or Perwanehs, which came at last to be issued by any body assuming English authority, even by private merchants out of the service, the greatest enormities appear by the public records of the period to have been committed; not only in the way of trade, but against Zemindars, Talookdars, Ryots, and others connected with the public revenue. Even the revolutions which occurred in Bengal from 1756 to 1765, the capture of Calcutta by Serage ud Dowlah, with the miseries of the black hole; his deposition; the elevation of Meer Jaffier in 1757; his deposition in 1760; the cruelties and murders of English agents and dependants by his successor Meer Cossim; the war which ended in his deposition, and the restoration of Meer Jaffier in 1764, were all very much connected with the iniquitous practices and excesses of these traders and their Gomastahs. To such a pitch had these abuses been carried, that the Court of Directors, in their letters to Bengal in 1764 and 1765, condemn the conduct of their servants in the most unqualified terms. They say "that an unbounded thirst after riches seems to have possessed the whole body of our servants, to that degree that they have lost all sight of justice to the country government, and of their duty to the Company;" and they look to the then expected arrival of Lord Clive and the Select Committee in Calcutta, "to remedy these evils—to restore (as they add) our reputation among the country powers, and convince them of our abhorrence of such oppression and rapaciousness."

In these letters, this trade is denominated the "inland trade in salt, betel nut, and tobacco;" and avowedly carried on, free of duties, for the benefit of the Company's servants. Salt, however, was always the principal article. But the Court of Directors peremptorily ordered the whole trade to be discontinued, and a formal renunciation of this right to be

transmitted to the Nabob, in consequence of a clause conceding it being inserted in the treaty with him of 1763, which the Court of Directors highly disapproved, and directed that part of the treaty to be annulled. They also required private privileged merchants, with their agents, to be recalled to the Presidency; and positively forbade their residence, in future, in the interior.

In 1765, Lord Clive's government conceived themselves instructed by the Court of Directors to regulate this trade, in such a way as should admit of its being carried on for the benefit of the Company's servants; but under such restrictions as should prevent the recurrence of abuse.

All private agents were accordingly recalled from the interior. A society was formed for the exclusive purchase and sale of salt, etc., at certain specified markets; their affairs to be managed by a committee, and the shares of the society distributed among the Company's servants according to their respective ranks.

The selling price of salt was fixed, at the authorised markets, as 15 per cent. below the average price of twenty preceding years.

A duty equal to 35 per cent. was at the same time fixed on Salt for the benefit of the Company; which in 1765 amounted to £120,000, and for which the committee of the society were held answerable.

In 1766, this plan was modified at the suggestion of Lord Clive; and it was then resolved that Salt should only be sold by the society at Calcutta, and at a price not exceeding two rupees per Maund. The retail of the commodity throughout the interior was now wholly left to native merchants; those of Calcutta being only allowed to purchase certain quantities, and the prices, as before, fixed at all the authorised inland markets, subject to a heavy penalty if these rates should ever be exceeded by the native dealers.

The duty payable to the Company was now raised to £50 per cent.; so that the revenue from this head for 1766 is stated at £160,000, or about sixteen lacs of rupees.

The Court of Directors, however, disapproved of the plan of the society; so that it was finally abolished on the 1st of September, 1767, with one year's grace to enable the society to wind up their concerns. In lieu of the profits on this trade, a commission of two and a half per cent. on the revenues, amounting to £63,000 per annum, was distributed among the servants; but, as Mr. Verelst observes, "when the general restraints of inland trade were no longer supported by the private interest and authority of the council, Europeans largely engaged under the names of their black agents, and the profits of this commerce were added to the public allowance."

We learn further from Mr. Verelst, that previous to the establishment of the society, or from 1760 to 1765, the price of Salt in Calcutta was 100 Arcot rupees, to 170 rupees per 100 Maunds.* On the other hand, it is stated in Mr. Tucker's late "Review," that, under the present monopoly, the price of Salt was raised in the March sale of 1822, to 437 rupees per 100 Maunds, and to 593 rupees in the May sale of the same year.

The Society of Trade being, as above mentioned, finally abolished in September 1768, the manufacture was thrown open to private merchants and Zemindars; but under restrictions intended to prevent a monopoly of the article, and oppression of the manufacturers.

In 1772, it was determined, "1st. That the Salt in every part of the province should be on the same footing. 2nd. That the Salt should be made by the Company. 3rd. That the Collaries, or manufactories, in each district should be let in farm for five years." The farmers were to deliver the Salt at a stipulated price; which was then dealt out at another fixed price to the native conductors of the inland trade.

* The Rupee may be calculated as 2 shillings: and the Maund as equal to 82 lbs.

In 1777, the practice of farming continued: but the Salt produced was left to the farmer's disposal.

A new system was introduced in September 1780, "for the provision of Salt by agency; under which all the Salt of the provinces was to be manufactured for the Company, and sold for ready money at *moderate* fixed rates, to be ascertained and published at the beginning of every season by Government." The European agents employed to superintend the manufacture, were allowed a commission of ten per cent. on the profit realised to the Company under their management. This commission seems afterwards to have been reduced to three, and then to two and a half per cent. A comptroller, with assistants, superintended the whole department, subject to the orders of the Revenue Board at Calcutta. The farming system continued till 1786-7; when another change took place, by which the Salt manufactured was disposed of at public auction.

On the introduction of Lord Cornwallis's permanent arrangements in 1793, the Salt department was transferred from the superintendance of the Board of Revenue to that of the Board of Trade. In consequence of this transfer, the office of comptroller was abolished, by which the Board of Trade effected a saving in the charges of 60,736 rupees per annum. The system of agency was continued, and European agents fixed at the under-mentioned stations:—Hidgellee; Tumlook; 24 Purgunnahs; Roy Mungul, afterwards united with the 24 Purgunnahs; Chittagong and Bulwa.

In the investigations made by the Board of Trade into the management of this department, it came out, that two systems prevailed for the manufacture of Salt; one a system of coercion, by persons called Adjoora Molungees or *Manufacturers;* and the other by free compact with persons called Ticka Molungees. It appears that the Adjoora Molungees only got about one-half as much for their coerced labour, as was given for the free labour of their Ticka brethren; and that this miserable pittance was neither proportioned to the ordinary rate of labour in the country, nor was it sufficient to keep the Adjoora Molungee in common health and strength. The Adjoora Molungees had frequently petitioned to be put on the same footing as the Ticka class; and their case was now strongly recommended to the favourable consideration of Government. At this time there were, in the agencies of Hidgellee and Tumlook alone, no less than 13,388 families in the wretched condition above described; over whom and their ancestors this system of coercion had existed for centuries. The Board of Trade could only account for it by supposing that the Adjooras formerly held lands free, or at a low rate, on condition of furnishing certain quantities of Salt at reduced prices, as an equivalent for rent, and that in process of time Zemindars, and others, managed to get the full rents of the lands without any alteration either in the required supplies, or old prices of Salt. Abuses of power of this description were common enough, which a depressed peasantry had no means of resisting. The Governor-General, however, immediately complied with the recommendation of the Board of Trade, so that the Adjooras were raised to the same footing as the Tickas towards the latter end of the year 1794.

It is, however, much to be apprehended, that even these rates were an inadequate compensation for the Molungee labour. The agent of the 24 Purgunnahs says, that the total net earnings to each man at the contract rates, even if the quantity contracted for were fully supplied, would only be six rupees, or TWELVE SHILLINGS, for seven and a half months' labour, the time during which the Molungees were commonly employed in each year in the jungles!!! Their poverty, moreover, was such, that this allowance was required to be paid in advance, whilst the quantity of Salt engaged for, and on which advances were also made, being almost always deficient, heavy balances remained in each year, not only outstanding, but irrecoverable, and, therefore, a real addition *pro tanto* to the price of the Salt actually supplied. On these grounds, the agent proposed to raise the contract price from fifty-five sicca

rupees to seventy-seven rupees per 100 Maunds, to which the Board of Trade and Government assented. The agent was consequently enabled to manufacture a larger quantity of Salt than before at this increased rate, the additional profit on which fully compensated for the additional prime cost.*

In 1833, upon the expiring of the East India Company's Charter, an Act was passed, 3 and 4 William IV., "*for effecting an arrangement with the East India Company, and for the better government of His Majesty's Indian Possessions, till the 30th day of April, 1854*;" which Act not only defines the actual position of the East India Company, as "*Trustees for the Crown of England*," but also shews the extent of their powers and privileges; as it distinctly states, that "*The Company shall discontinue and abstain from all commercial business that shall not be incident to the closing of their actual concerns, and to the conversion into money of the property herein before directed to be sold, or which shall not be carried on for the purposes of the said Government.*" If, therefore, we shall find the manufacture of Salt is not necessary "for the purposes of Government," a question will arise how far the East India Company are *legally justified in continuing the manufacture;* and I have deemed the matter of such importance, as to induce me to annex some of the clauses of this "*Charter.*"

The Act first recites the Act of 53 George III., cap. 155:—"And whereas the said Company are entitled to, or claim the lordship of the Islands of St. Helena and Bombay, under grants from the Crown, and other property to a large amount in value, and also certain rights and privileges not affected by the determination of the term granted by the said recited Act: And whereas the said Company have consented that all their rights and interests to or in the said territories, and all their territorial and commercial, real and personal, assets, and property whatsoever, shall, subject to the debts and liabilities now affecting the same, be placed at the disposal of Parliament, in consideration of certain provisions hereinafter mentioned, and have also consented that their right to trade for their own profit in common with others, His Majesty's subjects, be suspended during such time as the government of the said territories shall be confided to them: And whereas it is expedient that the said territories, now under the government of the said Company, be continued under such government, but in trust for the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and discharged of all claims of the said Company to any profit therefrom to their own use, except the dividends hereinafter secured to them, and that the property of the said Company be continued in their possession and at their disposal, in trust for the Crown, for the services of the said government, and other purposes in this Act mentioned.

"Be it therefore enacted, that from and after the 22nd day of April, 1834, the territorial acquisitions and revenues mentioned or referred to in the said recited Act of 53 Geo. III., together with the port and Island of Bombay, and all other territories now in possession and under the government of the said Company, except the Island of St. Helena, shall remain and continue under such government until the 30th day of April, 1854, and that all the lands and hereditaments, revenues, rents, and profits of the said Company, and all the stores, merchandise, chattels, moneys, debts, and real and personal estate whatsoever, except the Island of St. Helena, and the stores and property thereon, hereinafter mentioned, subject to the debts and liabilities now affecting the same respectively, and the benefit of all contracts, covenants, and engagements, and all right to fines, penalties, and forfeitures, and other emoluments whatsoever, which the said Company shall be seised or possessed of, or entitled unto, on the 22nd day of April, 1834, shall remain and be vested in, and be held, received,

* The above history of the Salt Trade is taken from Rickards' India.

and exercised respectively, according to the nature and quality, estate and interest, of and in the same respectively, by the said Company, in trust for His Majesty, his heirs, and successors, for the service of the government of India, discharged of all claims of the said Company, to any profit or advantage therefrom to their own use, except the dividend on their capital stock, secured to them as hereinafter is mentioned, subject to such powers and authorities for the superintendance, direction, and control over the acts, operations, and concerns of the said Company as have been already made or provided by any Act or Acts of Parliament in that behalf, or are made or provided by this Act."

* * * *And then subsequently goes on to say:* * * * *

"It is enacted, That the said Company shall, with all convenient speed, after the 22nd day of April, 1834, close their commercial business, and make sale of all their merchandise, stores, and effects, at home and abroad, distinguished in their account books as commercial assets, and all their warehouses, lands, tenements, hereditaments, and property whatsoever, which may not be retained for the purposes of government of the said territories, and get in all debts due to them on account of the commercial branch of their affairs, and reduce their commercial establishment as the same shall become unnecessary, and discontinue and abstain from all commercial business which shall not be incident to the closing of their actual concerns, and to the conversion into money of the property hereinbefore directed to be sold, or which shall not be carried on for the purposes of the said Government."

In the year 1836, a committee of the House of Commons was formed to take into consideration the actual position of the "*Salt Trade in British India*"; and, after collecting a vast quantity of evidence *pro* and *con*, as regards the manufacture of this article by the East India Company, the following was the result of their investigations, and the report made by them to the House:—

"The select committee appointed to inquire into the supply of Salt for British India, have considered the matter to them referred, and agreed to the following Report:—

"Your Committee having carefully considered the evidence which has been brought before them, both oral and documentary, are of opinion that the evils usually incident to a government monopoly in a great article of consumption, are not wanting in the working of the Salt monopoly in India; and they have not been convinced by any evidence, that the amount which has hitherto been derived from the monopoly, might not be collected with equal security to the revenue, and great advantage to the consumer and to commerce, under a combined system of customs and excise.

"Aware, however, that the safety of such a change must in a great degree depend upon local circumstances, of which they may not be in full possession, and unwilling to recommend any measure which might possibly endanger any portion of the revenue,—in deference also to high Indian authorities, who dispute the practicability of a system of excise in that country,—your Committee are not prepared to go further, at present, on that point, than to call upon the Government to give to it the most serious and early attention. They submit, however, with confidence, the following recommendations:—

"That the Government do abolish the system of public sales, and do keep their Golahs at all times open for the sale of Salt, at the cost price, in quantities not less than 100 maunds; the purchaser to pay, in addition, a fixed duty on removing the Salt from the Golahs.

"That the Salt manufactured in any country other than the districts subject to the Bengal monopoly, may be imported into Calcutta, and may be sold at such times as the proprietaries may please, in quantities not less that 100 maunds; and that such Salt, on being removed, do pay the same duty as that sold by the East India Company, and no other duty or charge whatsoever, except a fair and reasonable rent on such Salt as may have been bonded.

"That the duty to be imposed shall be fixed at the lowest rate consistent with the

maintenance of the revenue, and not exceeding the average rate of the net profit of the Company's monopoly for the last ten years.

"If these recommendations are fully and fairly carried out, they will, in the opinion of your Committee, reduce the monopoly of the Company to one solely of manufacture, and destroy the sub-monopolies which have necessarily accompanied the existing system. The difficulties which have hitherto stood in the way of a fair competition between native and imported Salt being thus removed, they hope that a wholesome and important trade from Madras and Ceylon may be encouraged, and that British commerce may be no longer shut out from the advantage of conveying a cheap, good, and bulky article of British produce to a distant portion of the globe."

In consequence of these recommendations, the system of public sales was abolished, and the Government Golahs, or warehouses, were opened for the sale of Salt at a fixed price, (as per Table No. 2., in the Appendix, which shews the rates at which the various descriptions are at the present time available to the public), but owing to the East India Company's refusing to levy the customs' duty on imported Salt *when sold*, the above concession has become (vide Chapter V.) a dead letter.

CHAPTER II.

SALT REVENUE AND AMOUNT OF SMUGGLING.

Mr. Tucker, in his Review of the "Financial Situation of the East India Company," characterises the Government manufacture of Salt as "*A branch of public resources, upon whose stability and permanency the Government of India can most confidently rely.*" Being levied on one of the first necessaries of life, it would be impossible that aught could be conceived whence, as Mr. Tucker says, a more "stable and permanent revenue" could be expected; as, in the words of the Board of Salt, "it bears equally on all:" but I am prepared to doubt, whether, independently of the evils and misery it has caused, an equal amount of Revenue has been secured, to that which would have accrued, had the Government of India abandoned manufacturing on its own account, and drawn the same from a combined system of Duty and Excise; and whether, regarding it as a Fiscal enactment, the manufacture by the Company has not been a complete failure.

In the correspondence that took place between Mr. W. Worthington, and Mr. J. C. Melville, Secretary of the East India Company, I perceive an extract from a communication from Mr. Secretary Bushby of Calcutta, which runs as follows:—"*The prices for Salt sold by wholesale on account of Government, are fixed with reference to the principle, that they shall not fall short of the cost of provision, plus the Duty on Imported Salt.*" IF, THEREFORE, WE SHALL FIND THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA HAS NOT NETTED THREE RUPEES PER MAUND (WHICH IS THE DUTY ON IMPORTED SALT), THEY HAVE, IN REALITY, CAUSED A LOSS TO THE REVENUE OF THIS COUNTRY BY MANUFACTURING; AND THE CONTINUATION OF THE SALT MONOPOLY BY THE EAST INDIA COMPANY CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED, EVEN ON THE SCORE OF REVENUE!!!

Now, by referring to Table, No. 7, in the Appendix, we perceive that the total amount of Salt manufactured by the East India Company, between the years 1793-94, and 1844-45, was, inclusive of the comparatively small amount imported, not less than 237,347,554 maunds, and which, at three rupees per maund, should have yielded the Government a net revenue of 712,042,662 rupees, or 71,204,266*l.* Sterling; whereas, according to Table 8 in the Appendix, the net revenue the East India Company realised, has been only 606,268,280 rupees, or 60,626,828*l.* Sterling, *thereby showing a loss by manufacturing of no less than C. Rupees*, 105,774,382, *or upwards of ten and a half million pounds Sterling;* and by analysing the statement, it will be found, that from the year 1793-4, down to the present period, there have only been five years when the "*Manufacturing*" has not shown a heavy and material loss over what may be termed the "*Revenue System;*" so that, even by the East India Company's own showing, it would, even *as regards Revenue*, be infinitely more advantageous for India to have been supplied with British Imported Salt, paying the Customs Duty of three rupees per maund, than to have had the article furnished, as it has been, by the Government manufacture.

Without discussing whether the East India Company can or cannot reduce the expenses attendant on their process of manufacture, it may, perhaps, be useful, and not uninteresting, to annex a statement, showing the cost of the various items of Manufacture and Collection, as put forward by the East India Company themselves in the year 1833-4.

ANALYTICAL STATEMENT

Of the Receipts and Charges of the Bengal Salt Monopoly for the Official Year 1833-34.

	Maunds.	Rupees.	Rupees.
GROSS PROCEEDS of Salt sold at the Calcutta Sales, and by retail, 5,229,746 17 9 mds.			18,153,229 10 3
Salt in store on the 30th of April, 1833	1,019,389 5 5	889,748 4 11	
Ditto manufactured and imported during the year	6,218,292 25 15	4,249,484 4 11	
	7,237,681 31 4	5,139,232 9 10	
Deduct salt in store on the 30th April, 1834	2,007,935 13 11	1,672,583 15 10	
	5,229,746 17 9		3,466,648 10 0
			14,686,581 0 3
Payment to the French Government		400,000 0 0	
Ditto to the Danish Government		18,750 0 0	
			418,750 0 0
Net Proceeds . . . . Rupees			14,267,831 0 3
CHARGES OF MANUFACTURE:—		Rupees.	
Value of Salt, &c. lost by storms and inundations		695,435 13 10	
Loss by robbery		4,064 0 0	
Balances remitted		209,690 11 11	
Aurung charges* (one-half)		295,264 7 4	
Charges of transportation		154,284 1 1	
Khalary and Parbeharry Khalary rents		284,448 3 2	
Rent of jungle grass lands		6,645 1 5	
Moshaira		62,682 6 4	
Bounty on salt carried beyond the boundary Chokees		771,247 2 0	
Khorakey salt		4,732 14 1	
Charges of receiving and delivering salt at Sulkea and Cuttack.		253,832 9 9	
Charges at Sulkea		49,998 4 3	
		2,792,325 11 2	
Deduct, amount received on account of Golah rent, wastage, rowannah fees, &c.		57,719 12 1	
			2,734,605 15 1
Gross Revenue . . . Rupees			11,533,225 1 2
CHARGES OF COLLECTION:—		Rupees.	
Aurung charges* (one-half)		295,264 7 4	
Salt-office		312,998 9 5	
Commission to salt agents		58,191 15 6	
Chokees		29,760 0 0	
Burkandauz		4,128 0 0	
			700,343 0 3
Net Revenue		Rupees	10,832,882 0 11
		Equal to	£1,083,288 0 0 sterling.

* Including salaries of Salt Agents.

We here see, that the charges for manufacture are not less than 25, and for collection 6½ per cent. on the net revenue; as also, that had the 5,229,746 maunds actually netted the Customs' duty, there would have accrued a revenue of no less than 15,689,238 rupees, or 1,568,923*l.*; whereas in reality only 1,083,288*l.* was actually obtained, thereby showing a loss by manufacturing in one year alone, of nearly *half a million Pounds Sterling*. It is therefore evident, as I before stated, that the present expensive system of manufacture must entail a comparative loss to the revenue; and the only question arises, whether Great Britain can afford to sell her Salt in the Calcutta market at or under the cost of manufacture of the East India Company. By referring to Table, No. 2, in the Appendix, will be perceived the rates at which the Government estimate the cost of their various descriptions of Salt, and which will be found to average over—

One rupee per maund, or			54*s.* 6*d.* per ton.
Price of finest English "Stoved" or first quality Salt, free on board in Liverpool, say on an average	20 *s.*	0 *d.* per ton.	
Freight, say from 15*s.* to 25*s.* per ton, gives an average of	20	0	
Insurance, and other small expenses at Calcutta, say	4	0	44
Leaves difference in favour of British Salt, of			10*s.* 6*d.* per ton.

or at the rate of just 20 per cent., which effectually does away with all idea of the Government of India, under any circumstances, ever being able to manufacture as cheaply as English Salt can be laid down in Calcutta.

Let us now proceed to see whether, viewing the manufacture and monopoly of Salt by the East India Company in the light of a Fiscal measure, the same does or does not deserve the high encomiums that have been passed upon it; and if it has answered the purpose which should, in the imposition of all Taxes, be specially considered, viz., the obtaining of the greatest possible amount of Revenue, consistent with the least possible amount of pressure and inconvenience to the people. In regarding the position of the inhabitants of India, a person is struck with the density of the population, which far exceeds any thing of the kind throughout Europe; and in order to convey some idea thereof, I have annexed the following statement, compiled from M'Culloch, shewing the relative number of inhabitants per square mile of several of the districts, subject to the Salt monopoly, as compared with Great Britain.

	Inhabitants per Square Mile.
Twenty-four Pergunnahs	492
Nuddea	382
Moorshedabad	407
Hooghly	548
Rajeshaye	1038
GREAT BRITAIN	240

Now, by referring to Table No. 9 in the Appendix, it will be perceived, that the population of these and the other adjacent Districts subject to the Salt monopoly, and which not only are the richest in India, but from which the East India Company draw their largest Revenue, had increased between the years 1813-14 and 1844-45 upwards of 50 per Cent. having contained 48,607,061 in the latter against 31,716,655 inhabitants in the former year.

If, therefore, a corresponding and proportionate increase has not taken place in the consumption of one of the first necessaries of life, such as Salt, the natural presumption follows, that the condition of the mass of the people must during such period have undergone a deterioration and decline. Now, so far, however, from any thing approximating to a proportionate increase having taken place in the consumption of Salt, we perceive, on refer-

ence to Table No. 7 in the Appendix, that the amount manufactured by the East India Company last year, only exceeds that of 1813-14 by 280,363 Maunds, or 6 per Cent., and that by the Government's own statement (*vide* Table, No. 9, in the Appendix), the relative annual consumption per head has declined from 11¾lbs. in 1813-14, to 11½lbs. in 1823-24, and 9lbs. in 1844-45, as also, that the relative net Revenue per head has fallen from 9¼*d.* in 1813-14, to 8¾*d.* in 1823-24, and 6¼*d.* in 1844-45. Let us, however, see whether this apparent impoverishment in the condition of the people of India is peculiar to the consumption of Salt alone, or is borne out generally in other matters. If, therefore, we refer to Table No. 10 in the Appendix, which shews the Import and Export Trade of India, we shall find that since 1813-14, the same has increased in the following extraordinary manner:—

Import Trade.		Export Trade.	
In the Year 1813-14:—Rupees - -	21,226,998	Rupees - - - - -	35,540,438
In the Year 1845-46:— - -	76,926,298	,, - - - - -	103,317,912

It may, however, be argued, that this increase in the Traffic and Commerce, and consequently in the Prosperity of the country, does not materially or directly affect the position of the *Mass* of the people (that is, the poorer classes), who are the principal consumers of Salt; but, in order to disabuse the minds of the upholders of the East India Company's monopoly of this idea, I have annexed the following statement, compiled from official documents, which shows that, whereas the importation, and consequently the consumption, of Glasgow fabrics (say, muslins, lappets, and such light cotton manufactures as are worn by the richer and more wealthy classes), have only increased from 1,027,862 pieces in 1837-38 to 1,983,701 pieces in 1844-45; the advance in shirtings, jaconets, and madapollams, or such goods as are worn by the poorest of the Hindoos, has, from 190,770 pieces in 1837-38, reached no less than 2,212,698 during the preceding twelvemonth.

Statement shewing the Importation *into Calcutta, and* Consumption *of some of the principal descriptions of Cotton Manufactures in use amongst the Richer and Poorer Classes in India.*

Fabrics in use amongst the Poorer Classes.					Fabrics in use amongst the Richer Classes.				
Years.	Long Cloth and Shirting.	Jaconets.	Madapollams.	Total.	Lappets.	Lappet Scarfs.	White Cambrics.	Book Muslins.	Total.
	Pieces.	Pieces.	Pieces.	Pieces.	Pieces.	Pieces.	Pieces.	Pieces.	Pieces.
1837-38	63,179	111,005	16,586	190,770	369,486	113,308	60,619	485,449	1,027,862
1838-39	190,012	221,949	15,491	427,452	524,384	422,127	123,625	358,101	1,428,237
1839-40	248,626	335,378	62,747	646,751	457,016	464,094	209,615	231,455	1,362,180
1840-41	416,200	542,820	50,865	1,009,885	455,866	365,226	199,318	252,866	1,273,276
1841-42	645,329	428,723	60,132	1,134,184	415,856	255,715	78,768	307,806	1,058,145
1842-43	1,018,500	644,976	116,511	1,779,987	495,154	636,355	97,804	382,924	1,612,237
1843-44	1,244,457	1,044,987	190,098	2,479,542	419,963	466,352	122,613	382,505	1,381,433
1844-45	1,572,749	540,910	99,039	2,212,698	605,036	778,728	122,045	477,892	1,983,701

We thus see that, although the import and export trade of Bengal has, between 1813-14 and 1845-46, increased from Company's rupees 56,767,436 to Company's rupees 180,244,210; although the consumption of the cotton manufactures that are worn by the poorer classes has, as per Table above, advanced from 190,770 to 2,212,698 pieces; although the population, since 1813-14, has progressed more than 50 per cent.; still, in the face of all this, we find that during these very years, a decline in the relative annual consumption and revenue of one of the first necessaries of life has actually taken place, as per Table No. 9 in the Appendix, from 9¼ pence and 11¾lbs., to 6¼ pence and 9lbs. per head respectively. On what grounds, then, can the Salt monopoly be defended? By what sophistry can it, even as

a fiscal measure, for a moment be upheld? Or by what pretext can it be proved to be "*necessary for the purposes of Government*"?

The question, then, naturally arises, "How is it, in the face of so improved a state of the people of India, there can have been so great a falling off in the consumption of Salt, which, even at its maximum, say 11¾lbs. per head, in 1813-14, is still ¼lb. under what the East India Company itself allows to be the average amount for each individual's annual demand?" And the answer that immediately suggests itself, and by which the diminution would be fully accounted for, is "the fact that the balance between the amount manufactured by the Company, and that actually consumed, is supplied by the means of SMUGGLING"; of the extent of which it is scarcely possible for a person not conversant with India to form any conception. By reference to the map that is prefixed to this pamphlet, the immense extent of frontier there is to be guarded will be perceived; and also how, from the innumerable streams and rivers it is intersected with, means of conveyance are afforded for carrying on an illicit trade, against which no establishment of Custom-House or Excise-officers could ever effectually guard; and in order to afford some idea of the working of the system, I have extracted from Mr. Crawford's statement a paragraph relating to the enormous amount of Salt that, on the Western frontier alone, is annually smuggled into what are termed the "Monopoly districts."

"There is still one local question on which I shall touch briefly: the smuggling carried on in the western provinces of the Bengal presidency. With a population of upwards of 30,000,000 consuming Salt, the whole amount of duty is but 160,000*l*., according to Mr. Trevelyan. The cause of this is, that two-thirds of the whole Salt is smuggled, chiefly in consequence of the enormous amount of the duty, which is three times as great as the prime cost of Salt in the native states along our whole line of frontier. 'Every one,' says the report, 'gives encouragement and ready assistance to the smugglers of Salt; the head men of villages are most courteous in affording them protection; and all classes combine to defraud the government of its revenues, in order to obtain this requisite of life at the cheapest rate.' It appears from the same report, that the whole of the native custom-house officers are bribed and corrupted, while the practical result is, that 'frequently Salt sells in the villages for half the amount which it ought to pay as duty.'"

In addition to the foregoing, were additional evidence needed, it is abundantly furnished by the Government of India in their own official communications and despatches, as in Mr. Secretary Prinsep's letter to the Board of Salt, under date, 29th September, 1834., we read,—

"*It is stated that no less than ten Lackhs of Maunds* (*or more than* 35,000 *tons of Salt*), *have been conveyed, illicitly, for consumption from the districts of Hidgellee, Tumlook, and* 24 *Pergunnahs.*" If, therefore, from these *Agencies* alone, which are three of the localities where the Company conduct their manufacture, and must be immediately under the eye of the Executive, smuggling, *to the Company's knowledge*, is carried on to the extent of 35,000 tons per annum, how much, let me ask, may we reasonably infer to be the *total* amount that is thus illegally brought into consumption?

In order, however, to arrive, with any degree of accuracy, at the extent to which this regular system of smuggling is carried on, either by direct evasion of the revenue laws, or by adulteration, or the use of other antiseptic substances in lieu of Salt, it is necessary to discover, as nearly as possible, what is the average annual consumption of each individual in the districts subject to the monopoly; and which, it must be borne in mind, are the richest and most cultivated in India.

That all computations on this point must, in the present state of things, be most vague, if not altogether imaginary, I am aware, as estimates range from 12 to 24lb. per head; the

former of which I consider to be as much under as the latter may be over the mark; in which opinion I am borne out by Mr. Crawford, who states:—

"The Board of Customs, however, will have it, that under no possible circumstances is it likely that a larger quantity of Salt than 12lbs. would be consumed by the people of Bengal. They insist that, 'the argument which holds good of the superior productiveness of low prices on all articles in general demand in civilised countries at home, is almost wholly inapplicable to the Salt trade in India, where the poorest individual gets what custom and convenience have taught him to eat, and where, such are the simple habits of the bulk of the society, little more would be used, whatever were the extent of the supply and the cheapness of the article.' My own opinion is, that a more unfounded opinion than this could not well be propounded. The people of Bengal, I have no doubt, should they ever get cheap Salt, will consume it as largely as any other class of men. There are even some circumstances connected with their peculiar condition, which would lead one to suppose it probable that they would consume even in a somewhat larger proportion than the inhabitants of many other portions of the globe. Their climate is damp; most of their country is distant from the sea air; their soil is not impregnated with saline matter; their diet is almost wholly vegetable, and remarkable for its insipidity; and the poverty of the great mass of the people is so great as to exclude them from the use of almost any other condiment than Salt.

"These circumstances would lead me to believe, that in so far as the mere alimentary use of Salt is concerned, the people of Bengal are likely to consume rather more than less than other people. Indeed, the government of Bengal, when taxation is not at issue, must be either sensible of this, or very prodigal in its allotment of the article on specific occasions. Thus I find, that when it has to determine the quantity of Salt necessary for the use of an individual, it never acts on the principle of considering 12lbs. as an ample allowance per head. A Bengal and Madras sepoy, on foreign service, receives a ration of three quarters of an ounce of Salt per diem; which is at the rate of above 17lbs. per annum. A Bombay sepoy is allowed the extravagant amount of two ounces a day; which is equal to above 45lbs. per annum. These allowances refer to services on shore. The allowances when at sea, somewhat preposterously, are much greater. In this case, the Bengal sepoy is allowed a ration equal to between 22lbs. and 23lbs. per annum; and the Bombay sepoy the same, with an allowance of some salt fish; whilst the Madras sepoy gets $2\frac{1}{20}$ ounces per diem, equal to above 50lbs. per annum, with some salt fish to boot.

"I may give another example: by the convention made with the French government in 1815, it is provided, that the government of Bengal shall furnish yearly the quantity of Salt that shall be judged necessary for the consumption of the inhabitants of the settlement of Chandernagore, 'reference being had to the population of the said settlement.' Now, in 1823, the population of Chandernagore was 44,538; and in that year, and with few exceptions ever since, the Bengal government has furnished, for the use of its inhabitants, 12,000 maunds of Salt, which is at the rate of between 22lbs. and 23lbs. per head; that is, very nearly twice as much as the estimated consumption of their neighbours, the inhabitants of the British possessions.

"It is a constant argument used by the Board of Customs against an increased consumption of Salt in Bengal, that Salt neither is, nor ever will be, used except for mere alimentary purposes. This is not strictly correct, even as applicable to the present state of things. A good deal of Salt (not indeed muriate of soda, for that being highly taxed cannot be used for such a purpose, but of other impure and untaxed substitutes) is given to horses, horned cattle, and even sheep; pure Salt, and in considerable quantity, would no doubt be given if it could be afforded. 'It is well known,' says the Board of Customs, 'that the wretched Bengal bullock scarcely receives from his owner that description of fodder which requires

nothing but the trouble of collecting it; is it likely, then, that he will give to his cattle anything that costs money?' 'In short,' it adds, 'all the speculations we have seen respecting the consumption of Salt in India, are applicable not to Bengal, but to a country five centuries in advance of any part of these provinces.' 'The poorer the bullock of Bengal the more he stands in need of Salt, and I have not a moment's doubt, in my own mind, but that the want of Salt is one of the causes which makes the horned cattle, sheep and horses of Bengal, by far the smallest and the puniest and the worst-conditioned which I ever met in any part of India whatever. The Board of Customs will have it that Salt will not be given to cattle in Bengal as it is in England. The system of which they are the most strenuous advocates makes it nearly impossible that any should be given at all; and no one need be surprised at this who reflects upon these simple facts, that the price of Salt in Calcutta is perhaps not much less than twenty times as much as it is in Liverpool, and the value of the Indian cattle which would consume the Salt by more than the same proportion less valuable. The heavy tax on Salt in Bengal is a prohibition upon all improvement; and if persevered in, the people of that province, at the end of the five centuries alluded to by the Board, would be no more able than they are now to give Salt to their cattle."

But, to avoid all cavilling, let us take the average annual consumption of an individual in India at 12lbs. (as estimated by the Board of Salt), which is less than one-half the allowance that is computed for this country, although there is a far greater necessity for the liberal use of antiseptics in a tropical than a temperate climate. We ought still, computing the population of the districts directly subject to the monopoly at 48,607,061, to have a consumption of the Government Salt of no less than 7,113,228 maunds per annum; whereas, in reality, by referring to Table No. 7, in the Appendix, it must be seen that the total quantity manufactured by the East India Company, together with that which is imported, is not more than about 5,500,000 maunds; thus, even by the confession of Government, shewing no less than 1,613,228 maunds to be annually smuggled: that is, the difference between what is actually consumed and that which is legally supplied; and whereby a clear fraud is annually practised on the revenue of no less than Company's rupees 4,839,684 or nearly £49,000 sterling. If, however, we take into consideration the total amount of population (as per Table No. 9 in the Appendix) that, either directly or indirectly, are in a position to draw their supplies from Bengal, we have a census of no less than 110,994,635 souls, whose consumption, at 15lbs. per head, would amount to no less than 743,265 tons, or between four and five times as much as the East India Company at present manufacture. If, therefore, the Government would reduce the duty from *three* rupees to *one* rupee per maund (and which, so far from being a premium on smuggling, would not repay the risk and disadvantages always attendant on the prosecution of an illicit trade), not only would the same prove a boon and blessing to the inhabitants of India, but would also realise a revenue of no less than Co.'s Rupees 20,253,971 per annum, or actually 700,000*l.* sterling more than is at present derived. To form some idea of the extent of the market that would be created in Hindostan, and particularly Bengal, for Salt, were the East India Company, by lowering the duty, to place the natives in a condition to become consumers of the legalised production, it is only necessary to refer to Table No. 9 in the Appendix, whence, it will be perceived, that there exists a population of upwards of 146 millions, all more or less immediately dependent for the supply of Salt on the three Presidencies of Bengal, Bombay, and Madras; and whose total consumption, at the average of 15lbs. per head, would amount to no less than 979,287 tons, which, at a Customs or Excise Duty of one rupee per maund, would yield a total net revenue, from the whole of India, of not less than 2,668,557*l.* sterling per annum.

CHAPTER III.

OPPRESSIVE AND INJURIOUS NATURE OF THE SALT TAX TO THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, AND THE MOLUNGHEES.—TENDENCY OF SALT MONOPOLY TO CURTAIL THE PRODUCTION OF SUGAR, AS WELL AS THE CONSUMPTION OF BRITISH MANUFACTURES.

MANY very conflicting and contradictory opinions and assertions have, from time to time, been promulgated regarding the working and operation of the Salt Monopoly, and the high prices thereby engendered; its supporters, or (what is equivalent) those interested in the continuance of the present system, professing to disbelieve that it bears at all severely on the mass of the people; while its antagonists not only accuse the monopoly of oppressing and injuring the social condition of the people, but of having also been mainly instrumental in having retarded the progress of civilisation and improvement from the rigorous severity which it has exercised over the body of the inhabitants. In order to arrive at some just conclusion of its real operation and effects, I have annexed the opinion of Ram Mohun Roy, a native, who, during his lifetime, was as much beloved by his own countrymen, for the faithful yet temperate manner in which he on all occasions advocated the cause of India, as he was respected in this country for his unswerving integrity and extensive knowledge.

"As Salt has by long habit become an absolute necessary of life, the poorest peasants are ready to surrender everything else in order to procure a small proportion of this article, though the dearth of the Salt is felt by the whole community; and the people in general are therefore obliged to make use of a bad quality, and few, comparatively, are able to incur the expense of procuring it in a purer form.

"As the food of the people in Bengal consists chiefly of boiled rice, which is, by itself, a most insipid kind of food, Salt, and ingredients dressed with Salt, are used to season the rice, and render it palatable. The rice is usually eaten with what the Hindoos call *byunyun*, or *turkaree*, and the Mussulmans *salun*; that is, something such as a little fish, or *däl* (a kind of dressed pease), or vegetables, according to their ability to procure these articles. But as they have been long accustomed to the use of Salt, the high cost of this ingredient sometimes obliges the poor people to give up their *byunyun* or *salun*, to procure it, and eat their rice with Salt alone.

"Salt, being, as I already observed, an absolute necessary of life, is now purchased, even by the poorest individuals, at the sacrifice of every other kind of seasoning and eatable but rice, the staff of life. If Salt were rendered cheaper and better, it must greatly promote the common comforts of the people. I do not know that it would immediately cause a very considerable increase of consumption; but to a certain extent it would undoubtedly: and from its cheapness, its use may be again extended by the people in seasoning the food of cattle; for which purpose formerly large quantities were used. The poorer classes, at any rate, would not, in this case, be compelled to sacrifice any other comfort in order to procure it.

"As I understand, the price of Salt is here about one-fourth of what it is in India; therefore there is no doubt that the natives of India would be very glad to purchase English Salt, if imported, excepting, perhaps, a very few professional Brahmins. The bulk of the people would make no distinction between the Salt which is home-made, and that which is imported. One-fourth (if not one-third) of the soda-water manufactued in Calcutta by Europeans, is, I think, used by the natives residing in Calcutta and its suburbs, and also a considerable portion of the liquors imported from Europe.*

* This entirely sets at rest any question there might have arisen regarding a religious antipathy existing in the minds of the natives against eating Salt that was not manufactured by Hindoos; and were further proof needed, it is abundantly furnished in the circumstance of imports of "*Foreign*" Salt having increased from 10,498 maunds in 1829-30, to 970,595 in 1844-45.

"The adulteration of the Salt is carried to an enormous extent, by mixing it with one-third, or even one-half of earth, until, instead of being like Salt, it more resembles the earth of which it is partly composed. Persons in comfortable circumstances generally purify it, by manufacturing it over again before they use it, or purchase it already refined, often at double the common price; but the poorer classes cannot afford the expense of either."

In addition to the testimony of Ram Mohun Roy, we have that of Mr. Crawford, who fully confirms the latter paragraph of the foregoing, as will be seen from the following portion which I have extracted from the statement put in by him before the House of Commons.

"The Salt Board itself, however, has incidentally stated several facts, which show that there is a real scarcity of Salt, particularly in Behar, the part most remote from the source of supply. This scarcity is implied by the admitted necessity which some of the more indigent classes are put to, of using septic, or impure, or bitter salts, as a substitute for muriate of soda. These salts consist of the saline matters extracted from the ashes of vegetables, which I presume can be nothing else than potash, or possibly, in some cases, soda, and of such as are procured from the refuse lye after the extraction of saltpetre, consisting, besides common culinary salt, of muriate of lime and sulphate of magnesia. Nothing but sheer necessity, I think it will readily be admitted, could induce any people to have recourse to such nauseous substitutes. The number of persons who are compelled to have recourse to them is by no means so inconsiderable as the Salt Board would have it thought. The evidence brought forward by itself, indeed, affords the best proof of this. In 1815, it was stated, in a public report, that, out of about 800,000 maunds of salt consumed in Behar, 150,000 consisted of impure salts, not paying duty: the quantity of these manufactured and used in 1834, is admitted rather to have increased than decreased; it is, howeyer, taken by the parties at the same amount, and the whole consumption made to be exactly what it was near twenty years before. The population of Behar, in 1823, was, according to the estimates made by the Directors before Parliament, 7,919,925; and, according to the rates of increase already given, it would, in 1815, have been about 7,057,000. At that time, therefore, upwards of 1,300,000 of the inhabitants of Behar were compelled to eat impure salt; that is, near a fifth part of the population was forced to do so."

But even prior to the Company's manufactured Salt passing into the dealer's, or sub-monopolist's hands, and at the time when purchased from the Government, adulteration to a very considerable extent has already been practised, and the general appearance and colour of the commodity (as will be seen on reference to the complete set of samples I forwarded to the Cheshire Chamber of Salt, in the month of May), is so impure and inferior, as would render it in this country not only unmerchantable, but, for domestic purposes, perfectly unconsumable. In support of this statement, I annex an extract of the evidence before the House of Commons in 1836.

"300. *Chairman.*] In speaking of the quality of Salt, how do you account for it, that an article which professes to be the pure muriate of soda, shall be deficient in its antiseptic qualities?—*It is stated, that in the manufacture of Bengal boiled salt, the Molunghees (or manufacturers) are in the habit of throwing in ashes from the fuel, by way of increasing the quantity delivered to Government; and, if such be the case, it will account for it.*"

There can, therefore, to an unprejudiced mind, be no question of a deficiency existing, both in supply as well as quality; and, from personal experience, and after a seven years' residence in India, during the greater portion of which I have been brought into close and immediate contact with all classes of the Natives, I have no hesitation in stating, that the absence of a proper supply of pure and wholesome Salt, in tropical climates, predisposes the human system to many, if not most, of the maladies that are considered incidental to the East.

Indeed, I have, in my own mind, no doubt but that that fearful and loathsome disease, "*Elephantiasis*," so prevalent amongst the lower and poorer classes of the Hindoos, is mainly, if not altogether, attributable to the want of an antiseptic to the vegetable diet, so universal in India; as I have, in many instances, found, that where the disorganisation of the tissues has not been allowed to proceed to an advanced stage, very beneficial results have ensued from constantly bathing the limb affected in strong solutions of lime and salt-water. It is thus evident, that, in the East, Salt becomes one of the first necessaries of life; and I will now go on to investigate, whether the price at which it is retailed to the consumer is such as to justify the assertion, that the Salt Monopoly is unjust and oppressive to the poor. The two principal premises on which any judgment can be formed necessarily being, firstly, "*the average "price at which it is retailed to the consumer;*" and next, "*the average value of labour "in India.*".

It is very difficult to ascertain at what rates Salt is retailed in the interior of the country, as much must depend upon the facilities of obtaining the smuggled commodity, the means of transit, and also various other causes, which, independently of these two reasons, would always act upon and influence the internal price of any article of merchandise; but, from information I have obtained from the Patna and Dacca districts, which are both within the limits of the Salt Monopoly, I should estimate, that the average bazar price is rarely, if ever, below three to three and a half annas per seer, or say at the rate of eight rupees per maund. If, therefore, we take the Board of Salt's estimate of the average annual consumption, say 12 lbs. or 6 seers for each individual, and compute the number of persons comprising a family in Bengal to average five (which is decidedly below the mark), we shall, estimating the annual earnings of a labourer at three rupees per month, or 3*l.* 12*s.* per year, find, that to purchase a sufficient and adequate supply of Salt for himself and family, he will have to part with no less than one-ninth, or say, one and a half months' portion, of his annual earnings. In those districts, however (which, I regret to state, form by far the majority), where the average annual rate of labour is not over 18 rupees, or 1*l.* 16*s.* per annum, on which the wretched ryot has not only to feed, but also clothe, himself and family, how fearfully—how dreadfully—must a tax, such as this, on one of the first necessaries of life, operate to retard the condition and social position of all who are subject to its baneful and withering influence.

The above remarks have reference to the Bengal presidency only; but though the Salt monopoly has not, up till lately, been carried out to the same extent in the Madras and Bombay presidencies, yet, from their population being so much poorer, it presses with as much severity upon the bulk of the population; the best proof of which is, that in the Madras presidency, notwithstanding the great increase of population, etc., the consumption of Salt has fallen off from 37,455 garces, or 93,687½ tons, English, in 1830, to 35,441 garces, or 88,602½ tons, in 1840; and though, by continually advancing duties on Salt, the net Salt Revenue in Madras has increased from 228,512*l.* in 1830, to 349,259*l.* in 1840; yet so completely had this tax exhausted the means of the poor ryot, or labourer, that the land-tax, the other great revenue of India, had, notwithstanding the advance of population, decreased 11 per cent. in that time, or about 300,000*l.*, showing that through this very tax, the resources of the Madras presidency were so crippled, that the land-tax decreased nearly as much as the whole of the Salt-tax produced.

In Bombay, very much the same features offer themselves; and therefore the proposal to advance the price there to the Bengal standard must be fruitful of the most intense distress throughout the presidency. Let it be remembered, that Salt is a necessary of life for man and beast; that neither can live without it; and that a great many of the famines in India amongst the inhabitants, and the pestilences amongst the cattle, have to be ascribed to the want of Salt, or the absence of the means of the poor to buy it, which is equivalent. That the Salt monopoly has

been one of the principal means of retarding the progress of India cannot be denied; and how keenly its operation is felt by the people of India, is evident from the serious riots which accompanied the late attempt to advance the tax in Madras and Bombay.

This is no exaggerated and highly coloured picture got up to excite the sympathies and feelings of the philanthropists of this country, but is a plain straight-forward statement of facts, of the correctness or otherwise of which; any one can, with slight trouble, fully satisfy himself; and I would ask, how is it to be expected, that civilisation, that Christianity, can ever take root in a land where, in order to obtain one of the first necessaries of life, a considerable, and, it is to be feared, the major portion of the population are compelled, either actually to engage in smuggling, or at any rate to purchase a commodity which they must be aware has been obtained by the instrumentality of fraud and an infraction of the laws? Such a system, in course of time, cannot fail, if not totally to destroy, most certainly to blunt, all pre-conceived and inherent notions of right and wrong, as well as the general tone of moral feeling and probity in India: for how can we expect that the poor, ignorant, and heathen Hindoo can resist such temptation, when, as will be seen from the following letter from Sir Thomas Stanley to Sir Thomas Bernard, even *in this Christian and educated country* similar enticing causes have produced similar demoralising effects?

"On the subject of the Salt Duties, as they affect the morals of the people, the evil produced is so great, that it can scarcely be too strongly stated. A man begins his career of villany by stealing Salt, thinking it not a very serious offence. The loss to the owner is trifling, and a fraud on the revenue is not connected, in his mind, with any idea of deep moral turpitude. Our farmers and shopkeepers cannot resist the temptation of buying stolen Salt; and it is almost impossible for any laws to be so framed as to prevent the practice. I really think it is the duty of Government to consider, in some degree, the frailty of human nature, and not to create temptations too great for the common run of men to withstand. We pay too dear for revenue when the price is public morality. We have an army of excisemen round the works, constantly on the watch to prevent depredations; but no vigilance can guard against the removal of an article (not possible to be missed) during some intervals of each twenty-four hours; and when this is offered for sale up and down the country, at a fourth or an eighth part of the price which must be paid for it in an open market, it cannot be expected that many would refrain, through principle, from becoming purchasers. Thus, a great portion of the community becomes implicated and leagued together, as it were, in a system of knavery. The morals of our lower classes are certainly much worse than they were. There are several gangs of thieves settled in several parts of the country, and known to the magistrates, who have been committing all kinds of felonies for years, and yet cannot be brought to justice. I am confident they owe their security, in great measure, to the hold which they have over the interests of the small farmers; and this must be chiefly attributed to the unfair dealings which they know are constantly taking place with respect to the buying and selling of Salt."

In addition likewise to many contradictory assertions having taken place regarding the influence of the Salt Monopoly on the main body of the population, much, if not more discussion has been carried on, with regard to what after all is but a comparatively minor consideration, viz., the position and condition of the Molunghees, or persons engaged by the East India Company in the manufacture of the commodity. Without, however, entering fully into this question, it may be quite sufficient to disprove, by the contradictory statements of the Government, the assertions so often put forward by them of the "happy and contented condition" of these wretched serfs; and, by comparing the following extracts, discrepancies enough will be found to justify our arriving at the conclusion, that the position of the Molunghees is little if at all better than the worst description of slavery.

Extract of Report of "BOARD OF SALT" to Government, January 26, 1832.

85. After all, we look in vain for any facts corroborative of the opinions which have been so freely advanced against the Salt monopoly; while its adversaries assume evils, its defenders are called upon to prove negatives; and even the difficulty of that process is enhanced by the vague generalities with which the tax is assailed. Where, we would respectfully ask, does it appear on the records of Government that the people of the Rowanah provinces have ever felt it or considered it an oppressive tax? To say that they would suffer in silence, even if they did consider it in that light, is to assert what experience in analogous cases does not warrant. Wherever a custom or a town duty is felt to be burdensome, little time is lost before it is brought either to your Honourable Board's notice or our own. We believe we are justified in making the same assertion with respect to the land-tax in provinces where it is not settled. The instant that even opium, a mere luxury, is considered to be fixed at too high a rate in the Abkarry department, the fact becomes known to the collector, and through him to this Board, or it is frequently brought direct to our own notice by petitions. A more remarkable circumstance, however, is, that from the natives themselves (we mean those of intelligence and reflection, and who are perfectly acquainted with the whole machinery of the Salt Revenue), we have never heard, nor do we hear, any opinions with respect to this monopoly corroborative of the views taken by some Europeans in India, and by the party writers in England who are inimical to the Honourable Company's government.

86. On the last point, we may confidently refer your Honourable Board to the newspapers published at the presidency in the native languages, and to the English papers edited by, and the property of, natives; they are characterised in general by an evident leaning to what are denominated liberal opinions, and are not sparing in their remarks upon real or supposed abuses. The defective state of the

Extract from Minute of Governor-General, July 18, 1832.

The Salt Monopoly, and the mode in which it is managed, has been for a long time a fruitful source of invective, both in England and this country, by all who are opposed to the Company's government, while little has been given to the public in refutation of all the calumnious assertions that have been from time to time advanced against the department and the government, for permitting the existence of the manifold alleged abuses. With such boldness have these been made, that I feel assured that many persons, not much acquainted with the mode in which the government of this country is carried on, look upon the monopoly as a measure of unmixed evil; they consider the Molunghees as a most ill-used and oppressed race, and believe that the lower orders of the inhabitants are unable to procure Salt to eat with their food. Loud complaints were for a long time made too, that Europeans were not permitted to engage in the Salt Trade; it was asserted, that the native dealers exercised a kind of sub-monopoly for the purpose of keeping up the price, and continuing to reap, as was said, their enormous gains; and great expectations were held forth of the benefits that would be derived from opening this new channel for the employment of enterprise and capital.

Extract of Note by MR. PARKER, Sept. 15, 1832.

Of the various evils attributed to the Salt Monopoly, not one has been more perseveringly insisted on, or more ostentatiously deplored, than the condition to which it was said to reduce the Molunghees.

Copy of a Petition from the Molunghees.

To the Right Honourable Lord W. C. Bentinck, G. C. B., Governor-General of India, in Council, etc., etc., etc.

The humble Petition of Juggurnauth Moety, Radhoo Booul, Nursing Moety, Mustoram Pall, Jeetrarion Moety, etc.,

police is constantly assumed and animadverted upon; the delays in the administration of civil justice, and the general corruption of native officers in all departments, are standing topics. The oppressions and vexations attending our system of custom transit duties and town duties, is often noticed, as is the bad conduct of the subordinate salt officers. The stamp laws are viewed in an equally unfavourable light; but, what would be an unaccountable circumstance indeed, if half the imaginary evils of the Salt-tax were well founded, there has been very little, if any, notice taken of the monopoly, either as stinting the supply of Salt, or as placing it beyond the reach of the poor; the charges against that tax proceed from Europeans alone, who are least likely to possess any practical knowledge of its effects, and who are still ignorant enough to imagine the *molunghees* to be a species of bondsmen, without being aware that the greatest difficulty we ever find in reducing the manufacture of an agency, or *aurung*, is the outcry it creates amongst those very *molunghees* whom it throws out of employ.

87. If now and then a native of talent and education, as Ram Mohun Roy, for instance, raises an objection to the monopoly, it is weakly urged as compared with the strong mode in which other assumed evils are commented upon; and then, not from any actual experience or observation of the mischief it is said to produce, but because it is contrary to some general principle of political economy; but on the same account similar objections are urged against the opium monopoly, though it is not pretended to include any of those grievances to the people at large which are charged against the tax upon Salt; and charged, too, by persons who never probably entered a bazar where it is sold, or took the trouble to make a single inquiry on the subject from that class of people who are alone able to determine whether it is burthensome or otherwise.

FURTHER EXTRACTS FROM ABOVE REPORT.

But it is needless to multiply instances, especially as the charge of oppression towards the Molunghees has, in this country at least,

Etmandaran and Mulungeean (or Manufacturers of Salt,) belonging to Hoodah Sawrah Bareeah, Nuechundpoor and Ossuon, etc., under the Salt Agency of Tumlook,

Most humbly showeth,

That your Lordship's petitioners are the Manufacturers of Salt of the Khalarees situated at the above-mentioned hoodah, have ever since received advances from Government, and manufactured Salt, who have always conducted their business with propriety and honesty; that since 1239, Bengal era, the Pokhtan darogah, Doorgadas Sain, and Ramrotten Sain, his brother, his private manager of business, in conjunction with the Ghat darogah of Salt golah at Narainpoor, have displayed great tyranny, and made much extortion from your Lordship's poor petitioners. Your Lordship's petitioners represented their distressful circumstances BEFORE THE SALT AGENT, in THREE DIFFERENT PETITIONS, and ultimately submitted to the SALT BOARD their DEPLORABLE CASE, in three different petitions; also, the Board held their proceedings in the above cases, but, UNFORTUNATELY, your LORDSHIP'S PETITIONERS COULD GET NO FINAL JUSTICE AND DECISION. As the case is long pending, your Lordship's petitioners, through poverty and misery, are unable to suffer any longer, have therefore ventured to represent their case to your Lordship's clemency, with the earnest hope that your Lordship's renowned generosity will order a final decision and redress on the subject that your petitioners are anxious for.

And as your Lordship's petitioners are in duty bound, shall ever pray.

(True copy.)

(Signed) H. TORRENS,

Officiating Deputy Secretary to Government.

and especially since the Soonderbunds have been divided amongst persons who find it necessary to employ labourers in clearing their estates, completely died away, and been replaced by another in perfect keeping with the whole system of the antagonists of the monopoly; for it is now asserted that the Molunghees are too well off; that they are the oppressors instead of the oppressed; in short, that they are fostered at the expense of the other ryots.

How it is possible to reconcile these statements, or by what sophistry the "Board of Salt" will endeavour to explain away their evident mis-statement of the "*Salt Monopoly not being grievously felt and complained of,*" when we find within, I may say, a few days subsequently, an admission of the Governor-General, that the same has been "*a fruitful source of invective,*" I am at a loss to conceive. It is equally difficult to comprehend how, without the grossest ignorance or the most deliberate intention to mislead, they can go on to state in the latter part of the same Report, that "*it is now asserted the Molunghees are too well off, and that they are the oppressors, instead of the oppressed*;" when, by reference to the above mentioned report of the Governor-General, we read "*they consider the Molunghees a most ill-used and oppressed race:*" and again, Mr. Parker, Secretary of the Salt Board on the 15th of September, writes, "*Of the various evils attributed to the Salt Monopoly, not one has been more perseveringly insisted on, or more ostentatiously deplored, than the condition to which it is said to reduce the Molunghees.*" And again; as evidence that such evils are really in existence, and the accusations of oppression not unfounded, we find, towards the latter end of that year, a petition actually presented by these Molunghees themselves to the Governor-General, complaining of the "*tyranny and great extortion*" practised towards them; as also, that having petitioned the Salt Board (who, therefore, could not have written the foregoing in ignorance) on "THREE DIFFERENT OCCASIONS," they could obtain "NO FINAL JUSTICE and DECISION." I therefore deem it needless to pursue further the question regarding the oppression suffered by the Molunghees, having, by the contradictory admissions of the local government and its officers, more than disproved the statements put forward by the "Board of Salt;" and will proceed to shew what would be the probable effects resulting from lowering the duties, and consequently the cost price, of Salt to the consumer, as also substituting the cheap wholesome manufacture of this country for the expensive and adulterated stuffs of the East India Company.

In a case of this kind, we can but argue by analogy, and judge of the future only by the past; if, therefore, on inquiry, we find that the natives of India, so far from being indifferent to their social improvement (as they are but too frequently stigmatised as being, by persons who possess but a superficial acquaintance with their habits and character), have, on the contrary, when put in a position to advance in the scale of humanity and civilisation, always availed themselves thereof, we may fairly infer, that, in proportion as the means of bettering themselves are offered, they will be prompt to adopt them. To show in what manner the natives have been affected, by the lowering of the duties on East India Sugars, and the consequent increase that immediately took place in the consumption of all European commodities generally in use, but particularly Long Cloths, Jaconets, and Madapollams,

which are worn only by the poorest of the poor, I annex an extract from Messrs. Aylwin and Co.'s Metal Circular of June, 1844.

"It is now exactly four years since we laid before our constituents, the effects we calculated the reduction in the Home Duties on East Indian Sugars would exercise upon Metals as well as upon British manufactures generally, in the which, as it will be seen, we have been most fully borne out by results; for whereas we perceive the consumption of Iron, Steel, Tin plates and Lead (or the metals generally in use amongst us for the conveniences of the middling and higher classes of natives) has not increased more than, at the utmost, say 10 per cent, we on the other hand find, as by our calculations worked out under the headings of the respective articles, that Spelter and Copper (which are almost exclusively used together in the shape of brass, either for religious or culinary purposes by the lower orders of Hindoos, every native having his brass "*Lota*" or water cup and "*Katora*" or Saucer, together with platters for baking cakes and caldrons for boiling rice) have increased in the following proportions:

	Copper.	Spelter.
1841—42	Tons 2587	1087
1842—43	„ 3039	1724
1843—44	„ 4268	2253
1844—45 (*first six months*)	„ 2626	2639

"Now, without entering into a history of, or a discussion upon, the Sugar question, there can be little doubt but most mercantile men in England must have been greatly surprised, some few years back, upon the abatement of the Home Duties on East Indian Sugars to a par with those grown in the West Indies, to have perceived the enormous increase that took place immediately in the exportation thereof from Bengal to Great Britain; many, even generally well-informed persons, imagining that the production of India was, as compared with its former rival, but small and trifling. That this popular error has to a great degree exploded we are satisfied; although we still doubt whether our home friends are generally aware of the immense quantity that is annually produced in this country. If, however, it is remembered, that the population of India comprises upwards of 140 millions of souls, all of whom (but especially the Hindoo portion), from the richest and most exalted, down to the poorest and most degraded, take into their stomachs daily, in the shape of sweetmeats (which with Rice and Salt constitute their chief staple of food), a quantity of Sugar that would scarcely be believed by a European; when, we repeat, this is taken into consideration, some faint idea may be formed of the enormous annual production and consumption of Sugar in India. Now, as long as East-Indian-grown Sugar was virtually excluded from the home-markets through the preponderance of bolstered-up West Indian interests, and the intrinsic selling value of our sugars lessened; so long, excepting in seasons of super-abundant crops, when a greater amount was produced than could be consumed, and was therefore necessarily exported, the grower, over and above what he required for his own domestic exigencies, looked to India and not to England as the market for his Sugar. When, however, East Indian Sugars were placed on the same footing with West Indian, an immediate and consequent rise in prices ensued, whereby the cultivator was enabled to net a profit of say from 100 to 150 per Cent.! and we at once saw thousands upon thousands of maunds coming down from districts where not only were we unaware that the Sugar Cane was in cultivation, but where previously there had been little or no traffic with Calcutta. That such new resources of trade were benefiting the country at large, no reasonable man could doubt, and, as we

then declared, were opening a boundless market for the manufactures of Great Britain amongst the lower classes of the Hindoos, most of whom up to that time, so far from purchasing, very probably had never even seen a piece of cotton cloth in the whole course of their lives. But, upon a market being found for the only article of production they were interested in—(Sugar being the sole commodity of which the cultivation in India is not monopolised either by Europeans or wealthy native Zemindars; all other articles, as Indigo, Silk, Shell Lac, Lac Dye, etc., being entirely in the hands of a comparatively few individuals, whence it necessarily follows, that whether a profit or loss ensue from such cultivation or manufacture, only particular individuals and not the country at large became affected; the Planter and Zemindar screwing down the wages of the sub-cultivator of the soil equally in prosperous as in adverse times,)—when however, we repeat, an opening was found where the poor ryot could dispose of the produce of his two or three beegahs of Cane land at profits such as we have stated, then indeed, the country generally was having a source of wealth poured over it, which not only did more towards raising the social position of that hitherto most degraded race of beings, viz., the cultivators of the soil, than have all the Edicts in Council that have ever been or ever will be promulgated; but also opened a market for British manufactures and enterprise amongst a class who, as we before said, have hitherto from poverty, caused by the grossest oppression, been in a state little, if at all, better than brute beasts. Many of our Constituents may remember the sneers with which these our opinions were treated when formerly put forward by us, at the time when we entered so fully into the future probable effects of the reduction of the Sugar Duties as regarded India; we being deemed visionary in anticipating that men who up to the present time had been accustomed to live *as naked as they were born*, would all of a sudden (even allowing our ideas in other respects to prove quite correct) be inclined to adopt, as regards clothing, ideas more consonant with a civilised country; and it was even stated, 'that the inhabitants of India not only required, and wore little or no clothing, but that many of them preferred (as a matter of choice) to exist in that state.' So far, however, from this being the case, it is notorious to any one at all acquainted with the domestic economy of the Hindoo character, that no nation in the world, (even amongst their lowest orders,) is so fond of seeing themselves and families respectably clad, as are the inhabitants of India; and all the stories that are current in England, regarding their preferring to live in a state of nudity, are, to say the least, absurd and ridiculous. True, a Hindoo, like an Englishman, will prefer to go naked rather than starve, especially as the nature of this climate does not *necessitate* the wearing of apparel; but put it into his power first to satisfy the cravings of nature, and we feel confident the next point the Hindoo will consider, will be his personal appearance. Were there any other proof wanting, that it is to the opening of our Sugar trade that we entirely owe the increase that has taken, and is daily taking, place in the consumption of spelter and copper, we would draw our constituents' attention to the aspect of this market for British manufactured white cotton piece goods, when it will be seen (per annexed statement), that Muslins, Lappets, Lenoes, and such fancy fabrics as are in use amongst the higher and middling order of natives, have not increased in consumption, during the last eight years, more than 35 per cent., whereas the Long Cloths, Jaconets, and Madapollams, which are almost entirely used by the classes of the population we have been describing, have steadily and rapidly progressed, in a manner sufficient to convince even the most prejudiced person:—

OUTLINES
OF THE
Country included in the Limits of
THE
SALT MONOPOLY,
OF
BENGAL.
The boundary of the Salt Monopoly is coloured Red.
CALCUTTA
Fort William
Burdwan
Moorshedabad
Dacca
Chittagong
Sylhet
Patna
Benares
Allahabad
Rajemal
Berhampore
Jessore
Midnapore
Balasore
Pipley
Kedgeree
Saugor
Point
Kedgeree
Saugor Island
Mouths of the Ganges
Bay of Bengal
Balasore River
Pipley River
Hooghly River
Bhagirathi River
Jellinghy River
Matabhanga River
Ichamutty
Assam
Tipperah
Chittagong
Arracan
Ramree
Cheduba
Negrais
Rangoon
Pegu
Martaban
Tavoy
Mergui
Junkseylon
Penang
Malacca
Singapore
Rhio
Borneo
Celebes
Java
Sumatra
Andaman Islands
Nicobar Islands
Ceylon
Trincomalee
Point Calimere
Madras
Pondicherry
Cuddalore
Porto Novo
Tranquebar
Negapatam
Karikal
Tanjore
Trichinopoly
Madura
Tuticorin
Cape Comorin
Palamcotta
Tinnevelly
Coimbatore
Dindigul
Salem
Erode
Ootacamund
Seringapatam
Mysore
Bangalore
Hyderabad
Aurungabad
Nagpore
Jubbulpore
Mirzapore
Allahabad
Cawnpore
Lucknow
Fyzabad
Goruckpore
Patna
Dinapore
Monghyr
Bhagulpore
Rajemahl
Burdwan
Hooghly
Chinsurah
Serampore
Calcutta
Fort William
Midnapore
Balasore
Cuttack
Pipley
Kedgeree
Saugor
Point
Jessore
Kishnagur
Moorshedabad
Berhampore
Plassey
Cossimbazar
Rajemahl
Dacca
Sylhet
Chittagong
Ramree
Cheduba
Negrais
Rangoon
Martaban
Tavoy
Mergui
Junkseylon
Penang
Malacca
Singapore
Rhio
Borneo
Celebes
Java
Sumatra
Andaman Islands
Nicobar Islands
Ceylon
Trincomalee
Point Calimere
Madras
Pondicherry
Cuddalore
Porto Novo
Tranquebar
Negapatam
Karikal
Tanjore
Trichinopoly
Madura
Tuticorin
Cape Comorin
Palamcotta
Tinnevelly
Coimbatore
Dindigul
Salem
Erode
Ootacamund
Seringapatam
Mysore
Bangalore
Hyderabad
Aurungabad
Nagpore
Jubbulpore
Mirzapore
Allahabad
Cawnpore
Lucknow
Fyzabad
Goruckpore
Patna
Dinapore
Monghyr
Bhagulpore
Rajemahl
Burdwan
Hooghly
Chinsurah
Serampore
Calcutta
Fort William
Midnapore
Balasore
Cuttack
Pipley
Kedgeree
Saugor
Point
Jessore
Kishnagur
Moorshedabad
Berhampore
Plassey
Cossimbazar
Rajemahl
Dacca
Sylhet
Chittagong

Statement shewing the IMPORTATION *into Calcutta, and* CONSUMPTION *of some of the principal descriptions of Cotton Manufactures in use amongst the Richer and Poorer Classes in India.*

Fabrics in use amongst the Poorer Classes.					Fabrics in use amongst the Richer Classes.				
Years.	Long Cloth and Shirting.	Jaconets.	Madapollams.	Total.	Lappets.	Lappet Scarfs.	White Cambrics.	Book Muslins.	Total.
	Pieces.	Pieces.	Pieces.	Pieces.	Pieces.	Pieces.	Pieces.	Pieces.	Pieces.
1837-38	63,179	111,005	16,586	190,770	369,486	113,308	60,619	485,449	1,027,862
1838-39	190,012	221,949	15,491	427,452	524,384	422,127	123,625	358,101	1,428,237
1839-40	248,626	335,378	62,747	646,751	457,016	464,094	209,615	231,455	1,362,180
1840-41	416,200	542,820	50,865	1,009,885	455,866	365,226	199,318	252,866	1,273,276
1841-42	645,329	428,723	60,132	1,134.184	415,856	255,715	78,768	307,806	1,058,145
1842-43	1,018,500	644,976	116,511	1,779,987	495,154	636,355	97,804	382,924	1,612,237
1843-44	1,244,457	1,044,987	190,098	2,479,542	419,963	466,352	122,613	382,505	1,381,433

If, therefore, we find that the immediate consequences of a reduction in the duties on the article in which nine-tenths of the mass of the people are more or less interested, viz. Sugar, has caused such a wonderful increase in the consumption of all such manufactures and commodities as are adapted for the poorer population of India, surely, by inference, it is not too much to argue, that any partial repeal of the Salt tax, which is such a barrier to any increased cultivation of the cane, and which also bears so heavily on the great body of the consumers of Manchester goods in the Indian market, would of necessity place them in a position to become greater and more extended consumers thereof.

In order, however, more fully to understand the reason of the partial relief that the cultivation and growth of the Sugar Cane has afforded to the mass of the inhabitants of India, it is necessary first to regard the average selling price of the manufactured article and next the cost of production; the difference between the two being necessarily the amount of profit that has accrued to the cultivator. By reference to Calcutta price currents, it will be perceived that the average value of Sugar since the year 1837 has been,—

Years.	Company's Rupees.
1837	10 4 to 10 12 per Bazar Maund.
1838	9 0 „ 9 8 „
1839	11 8 „ 12 0 „
1840	11 2 „ 11 3 „
1841	11 12 „ 12 0 „
1842	10 8 „ 10 14 „
1843	10 14 „ 0 0 „
1844	12 4 „ 12 8 „
1845	12 4 „ 12 12 „
1846 (the first six months)	11 8 „ 11 12 „

Now, in Messrs. Aylwin and Co.'s Sugar Pamphlet of May, 1840, we shall find the cost of the manufacture of Sugar stated to be, as follows:—

	Rs.	Ans.
Ten ploughings, at 4 annas each	2	8
Watering once, at 1 rupee per beegah	1	0
Three ploughings, at 5 annas each	0	15
Fifteen bundles of cane for seed, at 5 bundles per 1 rupee	3	0
Cutting, cleaning, and sowing the above	0	6
Watering for two months, three times	3	0
Hoeing nine times, at 3 annas each time	1	11
Manuring	0	8
Tying the canes, in August	0	5
Cutting the cane for manufacturing, including carrying	0	12
Rent of land	5	8
Expressing the cane, and reducing it to ghoor (or boiled juice)	10	0
Carried over	29	9

Expense of Manufacturing the Ghoor into Sugar.

	Rs.	Ans.
Brought over	29	9
Thirty maunds of fire-wood, at 25 rupees per 100 maunds . .	7	8
Servants employed	4	0
Sward grass, used for the purpose of claying	1	0
Earthen pans	0	8
Hire for boiler	3	0
	45	9

PRODUCE.

	Company's Rupees.	
7½ maunds fine white Benares, at say 5 rupees 3 do. grey do. do. 3 do. 5 do. molasses. 4½ do. dirt, etc.	46	8

But, to be well within bounds, we will suppose the finest white Benares Sugar to cost the grower seven rupees laid down at Calcutta, which, with freight at 4*l.*, and insurance 20*s.*, would stand in 25*s.* 6*d.* per cwt. landed in bond in England; but which, at the rates ruling at Calcutta, (say 12½ rupees per maund), costs 41*s.* 6*d.* bonded in England, with the same freight and insurance.

The natural question that immediately suggests itself is; How in the face of these profits (believing the above statements to be essentially correct), we find that the exportation of Sugar, instead of increasing, as was generally anticipated it would, has actually (as per following statement) declined; being last year less by 250,000 maunds than it was in 1840-41?

EXPORTATION *of Sugar from Calcutta; in Bazar maunds.*

Years.	Maunds.
1837-38	814,771
1838-39	869,107
1839-40	843,889
1840-41	1,784,791
1841-42	1,522,092
1842-43	1,605,530
1843-44	1,542,581
1844-45	1,539,117

To what then is this remarkable decline to be attributed? Has the demand decreased? Is the profit on the production lessened? Have fresh competitors arisen? Have new duties on exportation or importation been imposed in England or in India, to check the enterprise of the Bengal grower? Has the consuming population diminished? Or, in fact, has any rational cause ever been assigned to account for this mercantile phenomenon? I answer confidently and emphatically in the negative: none of the above mentioned causes have arisen. India enjoys the same advantages that she did in 1840-41; but she is unhappily not in a condition to avail herself of them. She is not enabled to put forth and shew her capabilities of production, while the industry and energy of her vast labouring population are paralysed, as they now are, by the oppression and injustice of the Salt Monopoly. There are limits to the extent of human labour; and while that is strained to the uttermost to provide the means of obtaining the bare essentials of existence, no margin is left for the application of time, labour, and capital, in order to procure clothing, which by the poorer Hindoo, I grieve to say, is now regarded as merely one of the luxuries of life.

The vast importance of this matter in its bearing upon the interests of the Manchester manufacturer, will be my best excuse for minutely showing, how, under a different system, the native of India will have more labour, and therefore more capital to spare for those articles of clothing with which he is now compelled to dispense.

To make this portion of the subject intelligible, it is absolutely necessary to bear in mind the statement just before made by me, that in the cultivation of Sugar, India differs from every other country where the cane is grown to any extent; as, so far from the same being cultivated on extensive estates in the hands of large proprietors (which is the case in Siam, the West Indies, Java, and Havannah, or even as Indigo, Silk, and other articles are in India), we find, on the contrary, that in Bengal and the Upper Provinces, it is grown and manufactured in lots of the smallest size, often not exceeding a few pounds in weight; and by the poorest orders of the rustic population; each cultivator or ryot having generally round his little hut a small patch of ground, on which he has, from time immemorial, been accustomed to produce just sufficient for his domestic consumption. Until lately, however, or say prior to the rise in Sugar taking place, the value of his labours has never been sufficient to induce him to regard his Cane Crop as an article of traffic or of commerce. When, however, the increased demand for Indian Sugar took place, and a heightened price tempted him to withdraw for sale a portion of that which had been raised for his domestic consumption, an extra supply to the extent of about 30,000 tons was *suddenly in one season* brought into the market, and speculations of the wildest nature were rife, that within a given number of years this country would draw her entire supplies from her Eastern Colonies. It was soon, however, discovered that these expectations were far from being likely to be realised, and that the poverty and misery of the growers of the cane were effectual barriers against any extension of the cultivation or increase in the "*abstracted amount.*" For, when we consider that the produce of one and a half to three months of every ryot's labour is swallowed up and absorbed in the purchase of *Salt* alone, any one taking into account the value of Wages in the East, must perceive how effectually the extra labour of the population, beyond what is requisite to furnish the first necessaries of life, is monopolised by the Salt tax; as, the few extra pence or shillings each ryot has been annually able to earn, by the abstraction of that portion of his wretchedly small amount of production which he can spare for sale, have been barely sufficient to enable him to supply that which he hitherto had been forced to forego, viz., partial clothing for himself and family, sufficient to prevent their bodies remaining in a state of absolute nudity. It may, perhaps, be argued that, even allowing the duty were lowered from three Rupees to one Rupee per maund, the individual benefit that would accrue to the ryot would be far too small to enable him to increase to any material extent his consumption of garments and articles of clothing, and that any surplus difference he might thence derive would be spent and made use of for other purposes. Regarding the correctness or otherwise of this suggestion, I think it unnecessary to reply, as it is placing the case in a false position. The real question is, whether, by reducing the Salt Tax from three Rupees to one Rupee per maund, you would not thus afford the cultivator of the soil, even under the most unfavourable circumstances, from about one to three months' extra labour for the producing of the Sugar Cane, but which time is now absorbed and taken up to enable him to procure a sufficient supply of the simple article of Salt: and, viewing the question in this light, some idea may be formed of the tremendous increase in production there would immediately result therefrom, and the consequent stream of wealth that would flow into India; thus necessarily placing the inhabitants in a position to become more extensively than they now are consumers of Cotton, and other suitable descriptions of Clothing. If, therefore, we estimate the total production of Sugar in India at 300,000

tons a-year, out of which 75,000 are abstracted for exportation, we should, estimating the increased production arising from increased facilities of labour at only one-sixth (or two months' average labour), have at once a further supply for the purpose of Exportation of no less than 50,000 tons, making in all 125,000 tons, or nearly double the present supply of our Eastern possessions. And when we consider the facilities of water communication that exist all over India; the millions of acres of the richest virgin soil that now are lying waste; the cheapness and abundance of labour; and the wonderful price at which Sugar is capable of being manufactured, it is still probable, could the producers be placed (as they would be by the reduction of the Salt-tax) in a position to increase their cultivation, that England may yet, in the course of time, draw the greater portion, if not her entire supplies, from that Country where, if out of the 140 millions of inhabitants interested in the production of Sugar, but one-third, or say 46 millions become consumers of only clothing enough to cover their loins; we should, estimating an annual average of three feet for each individual, have an additional market opened for the Cotton and Yarn manufactures of this Country of no less than 46 millions yards of cotton cloth: and I would ask, whether this alone (no higher motives operating) is not sufficient stimulus to the commercial ambition of the Manchester Manufacturer, to induce him to lend his powerful aid in the destruction of the East India Company's Salt Monopoly?

I will not pursue the question further. Though basing my calculations on the most unquestionable data, a further examination of the results of an increased manufacture of Sugar, springing from the accessibility of Salt *at a reasonable price*, may lead to such an extraordinary vista of increased markets, opening for the consumption of British manufactured goods, as to bewilder the most sanguine reader, and so destroy the high and interesting object I have in view.

CHAPTER IV.

BENEFIT THAT WOULD RESULT TO BRITISH SHIPPING BY THE OPENING OF THE SALT TRADE.

PERHAPS one of the strongest as well as most plausible arguments that has been adduced by the East India Company in favour of continuing their Local Manufacture of Salt, and against drawing supplies from Great Britain, is, that, not only would it make India dependent, for its supply of one of the first necessaries of life, on a country whose mercantile situation is from four to five months' voyage distant; but also that it would be next to impossible, without most serious derangement of the commercial relations existing between the two countries, to find an adequate supply of British tonnage for the transport of no less than 165,000 tons of Salt (which, as per Table No. 9. in the Appendix, will be seen, is the average annual make of the East India Company), even allowing that the Home Manufacturers were in a position immediately to furnish such extra supply. In the first place, the East India Company never have been, nor is it desirable that they should be, requested to terminate abruptly their present system; and therefore it is needless to go into the question, whether the above amount of tonnage could, or could not, *at once*, be procured without serious derangement of the shipping relations of the two countries: but, as it has been shown, that the Revenue of the state would be far greater were the above amount, say 165,000 tons, to be British-imported Salt paying a Customs' Duty of three rupees per maund, than it is under the method at present adopted, *it is to be expected*, that, so far from vexatious obstructions, in the shape of deceptive bonding regulations (as per Chapter V.), being thrown in the way, every fair and legitimate encouragement should be given to the importation thereof; as, also, that, as the fine and superior descriptions of British-manufacture, by their smaller cost and cheaper production, will gradually displace in the Calcutta market the impure and consequently unwholesome Salts made by the Company, the Local Government will, in like ratio, be authorised to curtail and abandon *seriatim* such of their agencies as they find have been least profitable and least desirable to be retained.

That great misapprehension and unnecessary anxiety exist, regarding the possibility of obtaining an adequate supply of tonnage for the transport of so bulky an article as Salt and to so large an extent as would be required if India had to draw her whole supply from England, I am aware; and without, I repeat, discussing in what manner it would be possible for this country to furnish the entire amount, it may be quite sufficient, for all practical purposes, for me to show the quantity of shipping that at the present moment is actually available.

The amount of goods imported from India into England considerably exceeds in bulk the exports from this country, as is always the case between civilised and half-civilised countries; the latter being generally the furnishers of the raw or bulky materials, whereas the former supply the compressed or manufactured goods; and it is from this circumstance that ship-owners, in despatching their vessels to India, look to the *Return* and not the *Outward* voyage for their profits; insomuch, that although (as by the following analysis compiled from Table No. 14 in the Appendix,) the average rate of dead-weight from Calcutta to London, since 1840-41, has averaged 4*l*. 7*s*. 7¼*d*. sterling, and light goods 3*l*. 14*s*. 6¾*d*. sterling; it is notorious, that, during these years, shipments *from this Country to the East*, of Metals and other goods, have been generally effected at from 15*s*. to 25*s*., and sometimes even as low as 6*s*. per ton.

Average rate of Freight of Dead-weight and Light goods from Calcutta to London, as per Table No. 14 in Appendix.

Year.	Dead-weight.	Light Goods.
1840	£5 14 0	£4 12 7¼
1841	4 5 0	3 7 11½
1842	3 1 3	2 8 8¾
1843	3 13 6½	3 5 3
1844	4 10 5	4 4 1½
1845	5 1 5¼	4 8 8¼
Average rate of freight per ton	£4 7 7¼	£3 14 6¾

In addition to this, not only is a vessel on the berth for India obliged generally to remain five or six weeks, and sometimes double that time, ere she meets with despatch, but also, on the average, is even at last compelled to clear out and sail with two-thirds, and rarely more than three-fourths, of an entire loading. If, therefore, the ship-owner could obtain immediate despatch for his vessel, by either loading on his own account or procuring on freight, a full and complete cargo of Salt, whereby he would not be as many days as now he is weeks in getting his vessel away, not only would he be more than compensated by the celerity with which his ship would arrive at the market of her intended earnings, but also, in nine cases out of ten, would net a larger *Freight-list* than by the present dilatory and retail method of loading; in support of which opinion, I do not think a more weighty testimony could be produced than the following extract of Mr. James Aikin's evidence before the Select Committee of the House in 1836, as follows,—

"657. *Mr. Bagshaw.*] Do you know many shipowners at the port of Liverpool who would much prefer loading Salt immediately on the vessels arriving for Calcutta, than to keep them in the berth waiting for light goods?—*Certainly; and as I presume the object of the Committee is to obtain information, and not to enter into a contract, I will endeavour to show that the testimony I have given is correct. We obtain from Liverpool to Calcutta a freight amounting to 500l. or 600l., after lying on the berth a month or six weeks; if we could get the same sum by taking Salt at 1l. per ton in a few days instead of weeks, of course we should prefer it: even if we did it at a cheaper rate, the difference of time would more than compensate.*

"658. Is it injurious to the ship at all, the carriage of Salt?—*Quite the reverse; it tends to preserve the vessel; so much so, that the Americans for many years have been in the habit of salting their ships, and in consequence there are fewer instances of that most destructive of all diseases, the dry rot.*

"659. *Mr. Hogg.*] Would a ship laden entirely with Salt from Liverpool to Calcutta, be likely to injure goods brought home from India afterwards?—*Certainly not.*

"660. Of any Description?—*No; the Americans bring Salt for the purpose of preserving the timber, and the Salt continues inside between the timbers; and those ships deliver their cargoes in as good order as any other description of ships.*

"661. *Mr. Bagshaw.*] Of course the splendid ships employed in the country trade are constantly employed in the Salt Trade?—*Yes; and the cargo most susceptible of damage is rice. I am continually sending ships to take Salt from Madras to Calcutta, and then Rice from thence to the Isle of France.*

"662. *Mr. Hogg.*] Would it not injure fine goods, such as silk, the ship being impregnated so with Salt?—*Not at all.*

"663. *Mr. Bagshaw.*] Charters are even made of ships from Calcutta to ports in Great Britain?—*Yes, very frequently.*

"652. *Mr. Hogg.*] You said that Salt was not a bulky tonnage; now my question is a

comparative one; as regards dead weight, does not a ton of Salt occupy one third more room than a ton of Coals?—*No, unless it be stoved Salt, which is more bulky than common Salt.*

"653. How is it with respect to common Salt?—*A ship would load as deep with common Salt as with Coals.*

"654. Would a ton of common Salt or Coals occupy most room?—*I have never measured a ton of Salt or Coals, but I know that a ship will load herself full of Coal without being too deep, but not so with Salt.*

"655. How much does a bushel of Salt weigh?—*I cannot state exactly the comparative measurement and weight, either of Salt or Coals, but I judge of it from the circumstances I have stated.*

"656. Is not the weight of a bushel of Salt 56lbs., and Coal 86lbs.?—*I think that must be stoved Salt, not common Salt.*

"624. Would you be paid by 20*s.*, except by carrying it as ballast tonnage?—*Yes; I would take it entirely as cargo, without reference to other goods.*

"625. Would you receive a remunerating price at 20*s.* a ton if you were to freight a vessel with Salt exclusively from Liverpool to Calcutta?—*Yes.*

"626. Then I understand the 20*s.* you require would be a remunerating price to you as a shipowner for the conveyance of Salt from Liverpool to Calcutta, conveying nothing else?—*Yes; but that is always with reference to the return freight. We are going now often in ballast for the sake of the return freight; anything obtained as out-freight aids in making the voyage profitable.*

"674. *Mr. Hogg.*] How much Salt would a ship of 500 tons freighted with Salt only, carry with safety?—*She could carry* 700 *tons.*"

It will thus be seen how entirely the prejudice against taking Salt as Cargo is set at rest by the testimony of a ship-owner, not only many years extensively engaged in the Eastern trade, but whose vessels also have been accustomed to the conveyance of this article; and whether we regard the despatch which a Salt-loading ensures a vessel, the beneficial seasoning it affords the timbers, its easy character when at sea as cargo, or its far greater specific gravity and therefore superiority as freight over Coals; when I say we regard an article so adapted for the present exigencies of the British ship-owner as an outward cargo, and consider that, were India to draw her supplies from this country, employment would be afforded British shipping to the extent of 165,000 tons annually; I certainly think that the alteration of the present bonding system for Salt now in force in Calcutta, *whereby this would be effected*, resolves itself into a question that concerns the Shipping as much as, if not more than the Salt-manufacturer's Interests; and no exertions, no means, should be spared to effect an object so desirable to the shipping and commercial intercourse of this Country.

On reference to Tables No. 12 and 13 in the Appendix, it will be perceived that the requirements of Export Tonnage *to Great Britain direct*, considerably exceed the number of vessels that arrive out straight from this Country; the difference being made up of ships that have been despatched hence with outward cargoes to Australia, Ceylon, Bombay, Singapore and other ports in the Eastern seas, and which are induced to proceed up seeking home-freight from Calcutta, on account of the higher rates and quicker despatch generally to be met with at the Seat of the Bengal Presidency, but which would all have proceeded out to Calcutta direct, had it been possible to have procured a profitable and remunerative outward cargo; and I do not think a stronger proof of the correctness of this assertion could be afforded than the following analytical statement, compiled from Tables No. 12 and 13 in the Appendix, which shews an average annual deficiency of no less than 17,293 tons of direct Imports from, over direct Exports to, this country:—

Import Tonnage into Calcutta from Great Britain direct.

	Ships.	Tons.
1840—41	198	91,403
1841—42	250	111,148
1842—43	174	89,235
1843—44	160	77,172
1844—45	222	106,390
Total ships	1004 ...	475,348 tons.
AVERAGE ships	201	95,069 tons.

Export Tonnage from Calcutta to Great Britain direct.

	Ships.	Tons.
1840—41	221	104,697
1841—42	236	103,050
1842—43	249	121,017
1843—44	236	111,685
1844—45	254	121,363
Total ships	1196	561,812 tons.
AVERAGE ships	239	112,362 tons.

Average excess of Exports over Imports, ships 38 ..... 17,293 *tons.*

Now, presuming that such 38 vessels, whose average Register tonnage we perceive is 17,293 tons, had been able to obtain outward cargoes of Salt from this to Calcutta direct, as also taking for granted that vessels leaving this port and Liverpool for the East Indies, have on the average only three fourths of an entire loading, we should then have an additional 23,767 tons, or in all, 41,060 tons Register, representing at least 50,000 tons Burthen available at the present moment, for the purposes of the conveyance of Salt. In addition, likewise, to such 50,000 tons we must include the 22,772 tons that during the last year, as per Table No. 11 in the Appendix, have *actually been engaged in the transport of this article*, and we shall then have a gross amount of no less than 72,722 tons of British shipping, that either are, or would become, carriers of this new merchandise, provided a fair bonding system were introduced for it into Calcutta. If, therefore, at the present moment, there is now already engaged in the trade between Great Britain and India an available amount of shipping to the extent of upwards of 72,000 tons, or say, sufficient to carry out nearly one half of the entire manufacture of the East India Company; and there is also, as per Table No. 5 in the Appendix, a supply from other parts actually furnished to the amount of, say 975,000 maunds, or nearly 40,000 tons; surely the objections must fall to the ground regarding "the uncertainty or difficulty of procuring a sufficient means of transport." Equally untenable must be the argument, "that, were the East India Company to surrender their manufacture, India would cease to be supplied with Salt"; as, were encouragement offered, there can be no doubt that vessels enough could at all times be procured; for not only would ships take out Salt in lieu of Coals, Bricks, and Chalk, which are only shipped as a sort of merchandise ballast, but from the opening of the West Indian Cooley trade, there must, necessarily, for the future, be a still further increase in the Exports, with a considerably diminished available tonnage for the homeward conveyance of merchandise and goods. So far, however, from any premium being offered to British Shipping, as regards this article in Calcutta, the very reverse is the case, "*the same duty being levied on Foreign Salt on foreign Bottoms as there is when imported under the British Flag*"; by which means, not only is the solar evaporated Salt, which can be had on the shores of the Red Sea and Persian Gulfs for the mere expense and trouble of gathering up and conveying on board ship, put on a par with the British-manufactured, but also the conveyance of the same is surrendered to the Arab and Gulf ships; thus making them the "*Carriers*" of the East, and depriving British shipping of that which has always been considered their peculiar and legitimate employment, in favour of a set of half-piratical, half-barbarian countries, the value of whose imports on the average, does not, exclusive of the Salt that they thus import, amount, as per Tables Nos. 5 and 6 in the Appendix, on the average, to above 40,000*l.* sterling per year.

That it will be impossible in Salt, any more than any other article of commerce, for the Manufacturer or Speculator to obtain, even in India, for any length of time, more than the

average profits of trade, is certain; and should Great Britain eventually have the total supplying India with this article, the Government's present standard rates in Calcutta will either gradually decline to the home level, or, as is more likely to prove the case, the greatly increased demand there will arise from this country for export tonnage (as sooner or later the supply must come from Great Britain) will cause a corresponding rise of outward freights and thus enhance the cost when laid down in Calcutta, as the balance of tonnage will then be in favour of Great Britain, instead of being, as it now is, on the side of India. The question then naturally arises, whether, as this must tend to equalise the outward and homeward rates of freight, Salt, as *Merchandise* and not as *Ballast*, is able to return the shipowner a remunerative outward freight. Now, by referring to Table No. 4 in the Appendix, an Account of Sales will be found, shewing that with a homeward exchange, of 2*s.* per Company's Rupee, and with a heavy 9 per cent wastage, *Stoved Squares*, at 110 Company's Rupees, or, with the duty, say 410 Company's Rupees per 100 Bazar Maunds (after deducting 20*s.* per ton for first cost free on board ship, as well as for Insurance and loss of Interest), renders the shipper no less than £1. 8*s.* 1*d.* per ton net profit, which must be considered the amount of freight the article is able to bear. It will thus be seen, that, basing my calculations on Stoved Squares only realising 410 Company's Rupees to the ship-owner or shipper, there would accrue a freight of no less than £1. 8*s.* 1*d.* per ton; but were the British Salt allowed, as shewn in Chapter V., to be bonded on fair and mercantile conditions, thereby placing the importer in a position to be independent of the sub-monopolists, there can be no doubt but this description would command a very considerable advance on these estimates; the standard price of the Government's *Chilka* description being 424 Company's Rupees per 100 Bazar Maunds, and which is as far inferior to the English *Common* as the common is to the *Stoved Squares*. The prevalent idea, therefore, that Salt can only be conveyed to India as *Ballast*, and cannot afford to pay a remunerative freight as *Merchandise*, is thus clearly founded in error, as, also, that a deficiency of tonnage would prevent India ever drawing her entire consumption from Great Britain; for, in my opinion, the supply of British shipping will never, at any time, be long ere it will meet any demand that may arise to employ it; and if the high selling prices of Salt in Calcutta draw from this an unusual quantity of vessels, they will, should the homeward trade not have increased in a like ratio, not only certainly cause a decline in the return freights for Sugars and all bulky articles, *thus bringing them more cheaply to the home consumer*, but will at the same time also effect a corresponding advance in the outward rates for all merchandises, thus, as I before said, tending to equalise the outward and homeward rates, and, like every thing else, gradually working its own level.

The remaining argument, that, in case of war, India would be liable to be cut off from her supplies if dependent on this country, can, with a leading maritime nation like England, never hold good; and, if carried out, would defeat half the commerce of the globe, besides nullifying the objects contemplated by the abolition of the Corn-laws, which will render this country, at least partially, dependent for the first necessary of life upon the supply of Foreign Powers.

Great misapprehension appears to exist in the minds of many Salt manufacturers of this country, whether, in the event of the importation of all foreign Salts into Calcutta being placed on a fair and also equal footing, Great Britain would be able to compete, in the lower qualities, with the solar evaporated article which is produced naturally on the shores of the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, and which may be obtained for the mere trouble of collecting; as although, with respect to the finer, say the "*Stoved*" and "*Butter*," there can be no question but this Country must have the supplying of the Indian markets, it is argued that "*Broad*" Salt will be driven out of general use by the above mentioned foreign imported sorts, which, as

per Table No. 5, in the Appendix, will be seen to have increased in importation into Calcutta as follows :—

1838—39	207,509	bazar maunds.
1839—40	438,669	„
1840—41	571,310	„
1841—42	614,591	„
1842—43	893,892	„
1843—44	967,012	„
1844—45	970,595	„

In the first place, any one at all conversant with the Hindoo character must be aware of their extreme cleanliness both in matters of diet as well as clothing; and the Salt manufacturers of this country may rest assured that should the natives of India ever be able to obtain the pure and wholesome white manufacture of Great Britain in sufficient supply, and at anything like present rates, they will never consume the more dirty and impure sorts brought from the Gulfs, as the scarcely perceptible fractional amount that a difference in prime cost between 350 and 410 rupees per 100 bazar maunds would constitute when retailed to the consumer, would not even, to the poorest of the poor, be sufficient to force them to make use of the former in lieu of the latter commodity.

Let us, however, putting on one side all allowance for difference in quality, regard this matter purely in the light of a question of competition, and, viewing its different bearings, see, whether in the event of the trade being thrown open, Gulf Salt could by any possibility, in any large quantities, ever interfere with the production of this country. In the first place, it may not be generally known that the whole of the Gulf Salt is imported into Calcutta in Arab ships (the foreign commodity, so imported on a foreign bottom, being placed in every respect on a par with the British manufacture, brought in British vessels); and it is doubtlessly owing to the cheap method of sailing these miserable floating coffins (as the computation is that one ship out of every ten is lost, or unable to prosecute the objects of her voyage), that this solar evaporated stuff can remunerate its carriers and importers at prices under which the English Salt would render a remittance; as no wages are ever paid the crews of Arab vessels, but a certain pro-rata amount of the profits of the entire venture is allowed each of the parties who navigate the vessel, and who, from the captain down to the cook, are thus all more or less interested in the Out-turn of the voyage. Now, on referring to Tables No. 5 and 6 in the Appendix, it will be perceived, that upon the price of Coast Salt in May 1840-41 falling to 45 or 50 rupees, or say, with duty, 345 or 350 rupees per 100 bazar maunds, that a decline took place in Gulf exports from 229,824 maunds in that year, to 189,450 maunds in the ensuing twelvemonth; as also that in 1831-32, a similar cause produced a similar effect; whence it may be fairly argued that C. Rs. 50, or with duty say 350 rupees per 100 bazar maunds, is the very *minimum* rate at which Gulf Solar Evaporated Salt can be laid down in Calcutta; whereas even "*Stoved Squares*" would (as shewn in the account sales given in the Appendix No. 4) render at 410 C. Rs. a net return to the manufacturer, after deducting the present rate of freight, say 20 shillings, of no less than 1*l.* 8*s.* 1*d.* per ton, or nearly double the present market value in Liverpool. If, therefore, there is to be any great increase on the amount of supply India at present draws from the Gulfs, it is evident one of three things must take place,—

1*st. Either an increase in the general mercantile trade between the two countries.*
2*nd. The capability of Arab vessels to carry it as an entire cargo.*
3*rd. Or the employment of British shipping in lieu of the native craft that now convey it.*

In reply to the first alternative; Regarding the likelihood of any increase in the trade between

the two countries. By referring to Table, No. 6, in the Appendix, I perceive the value of the importations from the Gulfs are as follows:—

1840—41	789,450	rupees.
1841—42	722,781	„
1842—43	621,672	„
1843—44	750,426	„
1844—45	911,803	„

and I find, on enquiry, the same are for the most part comprised of Almonds, Dates, Brimstone, and Mother-o'-pearl shells, articles that can by no means be considered as "*staples*," or that are ever likely to increase very materially in consumption; and as there is not much probability of such demi-barbarian tribes as those who inhabit the Gulfs shortly becoming very large consumers of Bengal produce, we pretty well know the extent the regular mercantile trade between the two countries can reach, and which cannot, under any circumstances, give any material increase to the present amount.

2ndly; As regards the possibility of Arab vessels being able to convey Salt as entire Cargoes. It is the custom of all Arab vessels that trade with Calcutta, not only to interest every one engaged in their navigation in the Out-turn of the voyage, but also to make but one trip (that is, complete the round to India and back), in the course of the twelvemonth; whence it becomes pretty evident, that even allowing them to be sailed cheaper than any craft that float, they still are not likely to go on and pursue a trade in which they gross for their total annual earnings only C. Rs. 50 per 100 Bazar Maunds, or at the rate of 1*l.* 6*s.* per ton: as, if their legitimate traffic does not increase in a similar ratio, it follows that they would be necessitated either out of this to defray the homeward as well as the outward voyage, or if they could not obtain an increased selling rate for their Salt in Calcutta, would be compelled to confine their trade in this article within the bounds of their general commerce, and must have to regard it as they now do, in the light of an auxiliary, but not as an independent merchandise; for directly the price in Calcutta rises to such a rate as would remunerate the Arab for taking it as an entire cargo, without any return back-freight, the Gulf Salt would be driven out of the market by the English manufacture.

Lastly; Regarding the employment of British shipping in lieu of the Arab vessels that now convey it. It is not likely that British shipping will ever be so unproductive or so cheaply sailed, as to encounter the dangerous and tedious navigation of the Red Sea or Persian Gulf, for the paltry freight which this trashy solar evaporated brine can afford to pay; as even where vessels are chartered for coals to Aden, we find, in nineteen cases out of twenty, that they prefer to proceed to Calcutta, or their port of homeward loading in ballast, rather than incur the expense as well as the risk of mortality there is in collecting and putting on board a cargo, which, as before said, will realise but 26*s.* per ton.

The whole secret of the Persian and Arabian Gulf trade in Salt, consists in the cheap sailing of the Arab ships, to which this article, as an outward cargo, is, in the way of filling up, a valuable auxiliary; but to imagine they can carry on the traffic on the mere strength of a Salt cargo defraying the expenses of the homeward as well as outward voyage, is absurd and ridiculous; and directly the shipments of Salt exceed the requirements for tonnage of the homeward cargo, that moment the trade becomes a losing one, and will have to be curtailed or else summarily abandoned.

CHAPTER V.

EXISTENCE OF A SUB-MONOPOLY AND THE TENDENCY OF THE BONDING REGULATIONS IN FORCE IN CALCUTTA TO EXCLUDE BRITISH SALT.

On referring to the history of the Salt Trade in India, the reader will learn the nature or the tendency of all the various regulations and enactments that have been made "*ab initio*" by the Government of India, and which appear to have been framed, not only to secure the East India Company the complete monopoly of the manufacture of Salt, but also to keep the supply and trade of the interior of the country in the hands of a comparatively few Native dealers, who have thus been enabled, in course of time, to establish so powerful a sub-monopoly, as, during the system of Public Sales, to be able to dictate to the East India Company itself, not only the prices at which their Salt should be sold, but the quantity that should be put up and offered for sale. After the repealing, by the Local Government, a few years ago, of the laws whereby Europeans were specially prevented from engaging in the Salt Trade, or even purchasing at the Government Public Sales, and upon the East India Company's acting on the recommendation of the Committee of the House of Commons of 1836, by opening their Golahs for the general sale of Salt at a fixed rate, in lieu of selling by auction, it was generally supposed, not only would the sub-monopoly have been broken down, but also, in the words of the Committee, "*That the difficulties having been removed, British Commerce would be no longer shut out from the advantage of conveying a cheap, good, and bulky article of British produce to a distant portion of the globe.*"

In consequence, however, of a generally prevalent idea, that British Manufactured Salt could not be admitted for consumption in India, no steps appear to have been taken by the Home Manufacturers prior to last year, when a deputation waited on the Court of Directors, to ascertain whether it was possible to import into Calcutta the Salt of this country; and upon receiving an assurance of the non-existence of any laws prohibiting the same, shipments were made as per Table, No. 11 in the Appendix, to the extent of no less than 910,892 bushels, or 22,794 tons. Upon arriving in Calcutta, it was found that bonding regulations, as will shortly be shown, had been framed and were in force, of such a nature as to place the Consignee entirely in the hands of the sub-monopolists; and although the local Government, on several applications being made to them, denied that "the tendency of these regulations was to exclude British Salt from the Calcutta market," and appealed to the increase that had taken place in Bombay, Gulf, and other imported Salt, under these very bonding regulations, say from 10,498 maunds in 1829-30 to 970,595 maunds in 1844-45, as per table, No. 5 in the Appendix; still the same can never hold good as an argument for their continuance; there being no analogy between the two cases.

That this great increase in foreign Salt *can* form no criterion of the workings of the "bonding system," as applied to the British manufactured is evident, as not only are the sub-monopolists themselves in many cases actually the owners, either in whole or part, of the gulf-imported cargoes, but also, by reference to table, No. 3 in the Appendix, it will be seen, that the selling rates have averaged from 55 to 75 rupees, or say with duty 355 to 375 rupees per 100 bazar maunds, which is fully 20 rupees under the East India Company's Standard Rates for similar descriptions of Salt; and as long as the quantity of Foreign Imported was small, and bore but a slight proportion to the extent of the manufacture of the

East India Company, so long were the sub-monopolists too eager to procure and purchase a commodity for which they had, in the usual course, that is, when drawing their supplies from the Government, to pay 20 rupees per 100 bazar maunds more than what the Arab merchants were willing to dispose of their imported solar evaporated Brine for. When, however, the annual arrivals of this Salt amounted to about 970,000 maunds, or say 40,000 tons, and, in addition, an extra supply of 22,794 tons was all of a sudden furnished by England, the case was reversed, and the sub-monopolists soon found, that as consignees of British imported Salt were forced to clear, and consequently sell within three-and-a-half months from date of arrival of their Salt, they could, by holding back, procure the same at their own prices; and the consequence has been that "*Stoved Squares*," which, when first imported into Calcutta, ruled from 140 to 145 Company's rupees, had at one time declined as low as 60 rupees per 100 bazar maunds.

But even, independently of this, the bonding regulations *do not* affect the Arab equally as they do the British Salt, and for this reason,—with very few exceptions the British article is shipped either by manufacturers or merchants from this country, and is taken by the vessel *as cargo on freight*, and not for the owner's account, whence it happens that upon the ship's arrival in Calcutta, the consignees thereof only being allowed a certain number of lay days for discharging, are at once compelled to land and bond the same, in order to give despatch and allow the vessel to proceed with her return loading; whereas the gulf Salt, being all on ships' accounts, and it being indifferent how long an Arab vessel lays in port, as she only makes one voyage in the course of the twelvemonth, the gulf merchants are enabled, should there be any combination amongst the sub-monopolists, to allow their cargo to remain on board for three or four months, and so in reality turn their ship into a "floating bonded warehouse;" which, from the difference of the value of property, as well as time, the British shipowner or merchant could never afford to do.

That the existence of any sub-monopoly on the part of the natives has been frequently denied on the part of the Government I am aware, the "Board of Salt" in Calcutta, in their letter of January, 1832, having stated:—"*Indeed, we look on any combination amongst the whole body of Salt-merchants as altogether imaginary. We feel assured, from long observation, that there is no more foundation for the apprehension of a sub-monopoly of Salt in Bengal, than there is for a sub-monopoly of opium, sold nearly in the same way, and at the same place, or than there can be for the same apprehension with respect to the Tea-trade in Great Britain.*"

The allusion to the Tea-trade, is, to say the least, singularly infelicitous on the part of the Government of India, as Mr. Crawford, in his evidence before the Committee of the House, actually adduces this very circumstance, in order to explain what, in his mind, actually does constitute a ***sub-monopoly***, as will be seen by the following extract from the evidence referred to:—

"448. Lord ROBERT GROSVENOR.] As it appears you entertain some difference of opinion from the East India Company, with regard to what constitutes sub-monopoly, perhaps it will be as well for you to explain to the Committee, and to those who will read your evidence, what is your idea of a sub-monopoly existing in India?—*I conceive the sub-monopoly of Salt to consist in the combination of merchants, or brokers, or dealers, under whatever name, at the public sales of the Company; by which combination they are enabled to dictate indirectly to the government of the country the quantity of Salt they shall supply to the population subject to the Salt monopoly; they control the extent of the public sales, and therefore control the price at which the salt shall be sold to the people of India. This is, therefore, as much a sub-monopoly as that which existed in this country in the hands of the London tea-dealers and brokers, with reference to the supply of tea to this country, previous to the opening of the tea-trade, when the East India Company monopoly was in full force. It is in the recollection, I dare say, of some members of this Committee, that at that period, and when the system was partially broken*

up, the tea-dealers and brokers were enabled to control the prices and quantity at the public sales of the Company. It is in evidence before a Committee of the House of Commons, that one individual, on behalf of the whole trade, purchased the whole of the Bohea tea put up for sale at one of the quarterly sales of the Company; that is to say, purchased one-fourth part of the entire annual supply of Bohea tea consumed in this country. He bought the whole of the tea at an advance, in my recollection, of one farthing in the pound upon the upset price: he was the sole bidder. That, I apprehend, was pone in concert with the whole of the tea-dealers and brokers. It is very true he was compelled to give up this purchase, in consequence of a threat of a prosecution for a conspiracy; but the quantity and price were not the less controlled on that account.

"450. CHAIRMAN.] Since Europeans were permitted to bid at the Salt sales, have Europeans come forward as purchasers of Salt?—*I believe there have been but very few cases in which they have, and the reason of that is obvious enough—they were forestalled. A particular class of merchants, and those merchants natives, had possession of the field for nearly forty or fifty years. They knew intimately all the details and, if I may say so, all the tricks of the trade; and to compete with men under such circumstances was not a very easy matter, not only on the part of Europeans, but upon the part of any other class of native merchants. It is almost always the same merchants that purchase at the public sales; and although Europeans have been allowed of late years to become purchasers, very few have presented themselves. This state of things is not peculiar to the Salt trade; it belongs to every branch of trade long in possession of any particular class of traders, more especially if there be any thing like a common understanding among the parties in possession. It is difficult for persons unacquainted with the trade to compete with persons possessing a knowledge of it. For example, with respect to the tea trade just alluded to, it was perfectly open to all the world to go and bid at any of the public sales of tea; but it was totally impossible to purchase a single chest, notwithstanding.*"

Were further evidence of the existence of a sub-monopoly required, it is abundantly furnished, by perusing the Minutes of the Proceedings of the Committee of 1836, from which I deem it sufficient to extract the following answers of Messrs. Reid and Crawford.

"Lord ROBERT GROSVENOR.] Is there not a great difficulty that the English importer would have to encounter, namely, the complete possession which the Salt-merchants in India have of all the internal communication?—Mr. A. REID. *That is one of the chief difficulties; and it is impossible to know what the consumption of Salt in Bengal would be whilst it continues in their hands.*"

"Mr. J. CRAWFORD.—*The existence of a sub-monopoly was for a long time denied; but it is now virtually admitted, and there is evidence before the Committee to show, that there is a complete combination of the Salt-merchants and Brokers at Calcutta, and they have in reality virtually dictated to the East India Company the quantities of Salt they were to put up for sale.*"

It is therefore quite unnecessary to pursue this matter further, the existence of a sub-monopoly being most clearly evident, as also the enormous influence it has been able to acquire.

With reference to the Bonding regulations, the particular disadvantages the British Salt Manufacturer and Importer labour under in the Calcutta market, may be classed under two heads.

Firstly—"The necessity there is (as per Copy of regulations for bonding Salt, see Appendix No. 1.) that the Consignees of all Salt imported by sea and deposited in private warehouses, shall, at the expiration of *three months* from the date of the entry of the ship on which the same shall have been conveyed, pay the duty on the *full quantity weighed over the ship's side*, less $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. for wastage."

Secondly—"That all parties wishing to store and bond Salt are to make a deposit of the amount of duty in Government promissory notes, or in bills accepted by Government."

In order fully to understand the great impediments offered by the above regulations, and

the impossibility of the British Manufacturer ever being able, even partially to supply the Indian market whilst they continue in force, it is necessary to draw attention to the preceding pages of this pamphlet, as also the former portion of this chapter, where the reasons are shown for the entire trade being at the present moment *under the monopoly and in the hands of a comparatively few Native Dealers.* Without recapitulating the causes that have produced these effects, it may, perhaps, explain the working of the system better, were a case in point actually demonstrated; whereby it will be perceived *how the present Government regulations aid and assist the sub-monopolist at the expense of the fair trader, by compelling him, if he does not take the first offers he has made to him, to bond his Salt under such disadvantageous regulations, as no profits, however large, are likely to compensate for.* We will, for the sake of example, say, that a Manufacturer in England consigns in the course of the season to his Agents in Calcutta, ten Vessels laden with salt, each having on board a cargo averaging 500 tons; say value in England on board ship 500*l.* or, in all. 5000*l.* Sterling. Upon arriving in Calcutta, the Consignees of such Salt find, either that the market is, for local reasons, temporarily depressed, or that, as is now the case, there is a combination among the dealers against the importer, which prevents him effecting a sale, save at prices much below what the article should command; and the Agent is, consequently (being desirous of supporting the market and not sacrificing his Constituent's goods), compelled to bond the Salt under the regulations in force in Calcutta.

Being unable, from want of sufficient accommodation in the Government *Golahs*, or warehouses, to store his Salt there, he is necessitated to engage and hire a private godown, or warehouse, expressly for the same, it being impossible for him to lodge the Salt in his own godowns, where, most probably, he either has, or shortly will have, other produce of his own, in consequence of Government placing its seal on such warehouses, thereby preventing, or at least hindering, the free ingress or egress of all private merchandise. Before doing this, however, the importer is compelled to deposit with the Government the amount of the duty (say three rupees per maund, or 8*l.* 3*s.* 6*d.* per ton), in what is termed Company's Paper, or promissory notes, which assimilate to English Exchequer Bills, and generally render the purchaser, by sale value, an average rate of interest at about 4 to 4¼ per cent. per annum, as will be seen by Table, marked No. 13, in the Appendix.

Let us now see how this works: The British manufacturer, as before shewn, has consigned to Calcutta 5,000 tons, or 136,250 maunds of salt, the total value of which, in England, we have computed at 5,000*l.*; and, on its arrival at Calcutta, should there not be a market, and no immediate sale, it is required by the Government that an amount of capital of no less than 408,750 rupees, or 40,875*l.* sterling, in the shape of Government Paper, shall be locked up by the Consignee, as a deposit for the duty on an article, the prime cost of which is not one-eighth the value thereof. The necessary consequence of such deposit being made is—firstly, that the selling rate of commission of the Calcutta agent is thus charged on the value of the goods when sold, *plus the duty;* or say, with freight and charges, 50,000*l.* sterling: and which at five per cent. amounts to no less a sum than 2,500*l.*, *or actually one-half for first cost and value of the goods.* Now, by the regulations, the importer is only allowed to let his salt to lay in bond for three months; and although the charge and custody of the Salt is, during all such time, entirely and solely in the hands of the Government, he is still (no matter *how great soever* the same may actually be) allowed only 3½ per cent. for the wastage that occurs in transit from ship, and what is also lost from evaporation that takes place in the godowns, which, during the rainy season, on some descriptions of Salt, has been known to exceed 7 per cent.: in which case, there would be a dead loss, or deficit, between the amount allowed by Government for wastage, and

that which actually takes place, of say 3½ per cent.; which, on the gross duty of 40,875*l.*, is not less than 1,430*l.* 12*s.* 6*d.*, or actually more than one-fourth the original value of the Salt in England. In addition to this, even supposing that a mercantile firm in Calcutta is inclined, as well as feels justified, and has the power, of locking up for their Constituent's account so large a sum as 40,875*l.*, as deposit of duty on goods whose first value in England is only 5,000*l.*, and *that they have* Company's Paper in their possession, they must still be losers of the balance of interest between that which the same paper bears, say 4¼ per cent., and the existing current value of interest for money in Calcutta; which generally ranges from nine to ten, or two per cent. over Bank of Bengal rates, which are shewn in Appendix, No. 13; thereby making a loss to the manufacturer of the difference, say 5¾ per cent.; which, on 40,875*l.* for three months, is not less than 587*l.* 11*s.* 6*d.*

Should, however, a mercantile firm in Calcutta *not* be holders of Government paper, *as is very frequently the case*, they must, in order to deposit such securities, either borrow the same, thereby displacing a like sum of money as security to the lender, *which amounts to the same thing as regards the loss of interest*, or else *purchase* a commodity the market value of which has, as per Table No. 13 in the Appendix, *fluctuated within a twelvemonth as much as fourteen per cent. ! ! !* Besides this serious drawback there is the positive disadvantage every one labours under (whether buying Company's paper, bags of Sugar, or any other commodity, the current value of which is continually fluctuating), who is compelled to go into the market and purchase at a moment's notice, in order to supply an immediate and pressing want. Even, however, supposing that a mercantile firm, notwithstanding the above, is both able and willing to deposit Company's paper and conform to existing regulations, still what protection have they against shipments of Salt arriving *within twenty-four hours subsequently*, to some of their neighbours who may not feel disposed or be in a position to withdraw so large an amount of capital from business, and who, by forcing sales, may at once defeat the object that the above immense outlay of capital has been advanced to effect; I mean the supporting of the market and consequent breaking down of that sub-monopoly, which, while it exists, will always prove a barrier to the importation of British Salt. In reality, the case is reduced to this:—that, if the Calcutta merchant does not sell on arrival over the ship's side, whereby at the utmost he has only a few days to stand out against the native dealers, or say until the vessel is ready to deliver his goods, he is compelled to lock up in the shape of deposit of Company's paper, an amount of capital eight times the home value of the salt, in addition to incurring for his constituent in England extra charges, *caused solely and entirely by existing Bonding regulations*, amounting, on 5,000*l.* worth of Salt, to no less a sum than 4,061*l.* 19*s.* say—

The extra sale commission on the Salt *duty paid*; or say 5 per cent. on the duty, viz., £40,875,	£2043	15	0
Balance and loss of interest by depositing Company's paper	587	11	6
Balance of wastage between amount allowed, and the actual loss	1430	12	6
	£4061	19	0

Should a mercantile firm *not* be holders of Government Paper, and which, as before said, is *very frequently the case*, they must then either borrow the same, or deposit rupees with the Government as security for the Duty, which, as has been shewn, is, as regards the rate of Interest on money, precisely similar, and whereby, calculating the same at 10 per cent., the Manufacturer's loss by Bonding would be increased to no less than 4,495*l.* 5*s.*, as follows: say—

Extra commission on duty (as above)	£2043	15	0
Interest for three months on duty (£40,875), at current rate in Calcutta, say 10 per cent. . .	1021	17	6
Balance of wastage, as above	1430	12	6
	£4496	5	0

The Native Salt Sub-Monopolist is fully cognisant of the tremendous power which the present Government Regulations give him over the British Merchant and Manufacturer, and which is partly caused by the necessity there now is of clearing, and consequently selling, within three months and a half from date of Importation; there being no class of men perhaps in existence more keenly alive to their own interests in commercial transactions than are the Hindoos, who are thus enabled to dictate prices to the Importer who is glad to accept of any loss, no matter how heavy, on the Salt entrusted to his care, rather than submit to the total ruin which Bonding would inevitably entail.

The only reasons I have heard the Court of Directors have ever adduced why British and other imported Salt should not be placed on the same level and footing as their own, by being bonded in like manner with every other article in Calcutta, is, that "*the small intrinsic value of the commodity, as compared with the amount of revenue levied on it, is not sufficient guarantee in itself to compel the importer to clear the same and pay the Customs duty at the end of the three months and a half the salt is allowed to remain in bond.*" Thus, confessedly as well as virtually, nullifying even the semblance of "*Bonding*," if by that term I am led to understand that any option or power is given to an importer or merchant to allow his goods to be deposited for a certain period of time in a country, after which he is at liberty either to clear the same for home consumption, or else reship to such markets as may hold out greater inducements of profit; and in which case the *revenue* of the state where such goods have been lodged or bonded is not affected in any way by such importation and re-exportation having been made: Besides, has not a merchant even in India (as is the case in beer when it has turned sour) the power of *destroying* his own goods when the value of the same is not sufficient to induce him to make a clearance thereof? and why should Salt, of all the merchandises that are imported into Calcutta, not be permitted to be thus made away with? It being impossible, as before stated, that the Revenue can be injured or defrauded by such destruction; and as the same has not been brought into consumption, and no loss can accrue to any one but the Importer, I would ask on what pretext the East India Company set up a claim for duty on that which is *not in existence;* Salt having, to all intents and purposes, mercantilely ceased to exist, when it has become so intrinsically valueless as to prevent its being brought into consumption ?

Besides the foregoing, I have been given to understand that the sole remaining objection the Court of Directors have against including Salt in the same bonding regulations as every other article that is imported into Calcutta, arises from "*their disinclination to create jealousy among the Indian commercial houses by their being called on to select which amongst the merchants they will, and which they will not, accept as bail and security for the due performance of the bond.*" No doubt but the Indian Commercial Houses, if of the same sensitive mould and temperament as the Court of Directors, must duly appreciate and feel deeply grateful for the kindly consideration that is thus evinced, and the anxiety that is shewn not to wound or ruffle their mercantile feelings; but, let me ask, "whether the interests of two such large empires as India and Great Britain are to be sacrificed on account of the East India Company's superdelicate fastidiousness in rejecting or accepting a private Individual's or House's guarantee?" as also, "whether, if the Government of this Country are satisfied with the Bond of two respectable parties, their '*Trustees of India*' might not be contented with an equal and similar description of security?" and lastly, "whether it is not frivolous and vexatious to adduce, as an argument for upholding a system that is opposed to all received principles and notions of equity and justice, what must and can, after all, only be a question between the *Executive* in India and the merchants who may be the holders or importers of the Salt?"

If, therefore, duty is to be levied on the amount cleared over the ship's side, and not on that actually brought into consumption; if Company's paper or, in other words, Rupees

must be deposited, in lieu of personal security, as guarantee for the duty; and if separate Godowns are to be hired for the storing of this article; I say, if such is to continue to be the case, it will be far preferable for the Company to do away with the *farce of bonding for three months*, and for the merchants to have to pay the duty at once on ships arriving, as they will not lose aught either in interest or duty, saving the three and half per cent. allowed for wastage by the Company; but which will be more than compensated by their having full control over the sale of the Salt in their own warehouses, and the avoidance of the risk they now run of loss on the re-sale of the Government paper they have to place in deposit.

Should the East India Company be desirous of refusing to admit British Salt into India, let them say so at once; but do not let them so wilfully mislead the British Manufacturer and Capitalist, as to encourage him to believe there exists a fair bonding system, or the semblance thereof, in Calcutta; as the only effect the present regulations can produce, is that of placing the importer more completely in the hands of the native dealer, and forcing the Indian merchant to hold enormous amounts of Company's paper locked up, thus diverting his capital from its proper and legitimate employment in trade.

If on the contrary, however, the East India Company are really and *bonâ fide* desirous (as they profess) of placing the British Manufacturer's interests on a fair footing, and the Salt Trade in India on a respectable basis, they must not only increase the time Salt is allowed to remain in bond from three to at least nine or twelve months; but they must receive duty on the amount actually delivered into consumption (they having the custody and being satisfied with the security of the Godowns it is deposited in); and must also, as is the case in England, accept the bond of one or two respectable mercantile houses, in lieu of having the deposits made in their own paper and Promissory Notes; and whereby alone the British Manufacturer will be enabled to suppress that powerful sub-monopoly of Native Salt Dealers, whose very existence as a body entirely and solely depends upon the continuance of the East India Company's Bonding regulations as at present in operation in Calcutta.

FINIS.

APPENDIX.

(No. 1.)

RULES FOR BONDING SALT.

RULES FOR BONDING SALT IMPORTED BY SEA AND DEPOSITED IN PRIVATE WAREHOUSES, TO TAKE EFFECT FROM THIS DATE, 28TH SEPTEMBER, 1841.

First—Parties wishing to store Salt in private Godowns, under the Government orders of 11th August, 1841, to give notice of their intentions to the Collector of Customs in writing, pointing out the location of the Godown in which the Salt is to be stored, and making a deposit of the Duty in Government Promissory Notes, or in Bills accepted by Government.

Second—On receipt of this Deposit, the Collector of Customs will cause the Salt to be weighed and delivered from on Board Ship as at present, sending with each Boat-load of Salt for its protection in transit, between the Ship and the Importer's Godown, a Boat Note (as per Form annexed) signed by both the Preventive Officers delivering, and the Salt Chowkee Officer superintending the weighment.

Third—On completion of weighment, the Collector to report the out-turn, together with the amount of Company's Paper held in deposit on receipt of this information, and the Boat Notes which must be delivered up by the Importer, the Board will supply the Importer with a Rowannah for the full quantity weighed over the Vessel's side.

Fourth—On the expiration of three months from the date of the entry of Ship on which the Salt may have been imported, the Collector of Customs will call upon the Importer or Consignee to pay the duty on the full quantity weighed over the Vessel's side, less 3½ per cent. wastage.

Fifth—The Importer to write off all Salt sold by him on the back of the Rowannah, giving due intimation of Sale within 24 hours to the Board, to enable them to depute a Salt Officer to be present at the weighment and delivery; this Officer will not suffer any Salt to be removed save under a separate Rowannah to be granted from the Board's Office. He will also attest the endorsement on the Rowannah, as above provided, of the quantity delivered.

Sixth—A Salt Officer will attend during the landing of the Salt in order to put his adul on the Salt imported, and it will be expected that the Stamp so applied shall not be broken save in his presence.

Seventh—Notice shall, in all cases of Rowannahs granted for bonded Salt, be given to the Superintendent of Calcutta Salt Chowkees.

FORM.

No._____

Ship

Captain _____

Salt, mds._____

Date and hour of Despatch.

Boat Manjee's Name.

Signature of P. Officers,



No. Salt_____ Boat Note_____ (Running No.

Pass from the Ship_____ Captain _____

to the Godown of _____ situated at_____

Maunds_____ of Salt laden on one Boat of which

_____ is the Manjee.

Date and hour of Despatch from Ship.

A. B. }
C. D. } Preventive Officers.

E. D.

Officer of Salt Chowkee.

By Order of the Board of Customs, Salt and Opium.

H. TORRENS, *Secretary.*

APPENDIX.

(No. 2.)

STATEMENT OF FIXED WHOLESALE PRICE OF GOVERNMENT SALT *at which the whole of the Salt in Store at the different Depôts in India is available to the public, as per Government Orders of the 20th October*, 1844, *and 21st May*, 1845.

Hidgelle	Pungah Ghaut . .	Kalleenuggur . .	375 per 100 Bz. maunds
	Ditto . .	Kissennuggur . .	370 „
	Ditto . .	Terropeykea . .	390 „
	Ditto . .	Ramnuggur . .	360 „
Tumlook	Ditto . .	Narrainpore . .	385 „
24 Pergunnahs. . .	Ditto . .	Narrainpore, Bahirboony	395 „
	Ditto . .	Tuffal	
	Ditto . .	Balleeaghatta . .	400 „
	Ditto . .	Narrainpore, 1st Quality	400 „
	Ditto . .	Ditto 2nd ditto	— „
	Ditto . .	Goredah . . .	400 „
	Ditto . .	Beontah . . .	400 „
Chittagong	Ditto . .	Dhome Colly . .	387 „
	Ditto . .	Sudder Ghaut . .	
	Ditto . .	Arracan . . .	382 „
Sulkea	Kurkutch, Madras .	Permit, 1st Quality .	365 „
	Ditto . .	Ditto 2nd ditto .	362 „
	Ditto . .	Ditto 3rd ditto .	360 „
	Pungah . . .	Cuttack . . .	413 „
	Ditto . .	Khoredah . . .	419 „
	Ditto . .	Balasore . . .	418 „
	Ditto . .	Chilka . . .	424 „

N.B.—The Government reserves to itself the power of re-imposing the full amount of duty authorised by law should circumstances arise to render such a measure necessary; but no alteration whatever will be made either in the duty now fixed on imported Salt, or in the prices to be paid for Salt sold by wholesale on account of Government, before 1st August, 1845.

P.S.—*Subsequently extended until 1st April*, 1847, *as per Government Gazette of 25th March*, 1846.

H. TORRENS, SECRETARY.

BOARD OF CUSTOMS, SALT AND OPIUM.
The 1st November, 1844.

APPENDIX.

(No. 3.)

MONTHLY PRICES OF COAST AND "IMPORTED" SALT IN CALCUTTA.

In Company's Rupees per 100 *Bazar Maunds.*

	1840	1841	1842	1843
	Rupees.	Rupees.	Rupees.	Rupees.
January	50 *c* 65	55 *c* 75	75 *c* 90	45 *c* 65
February	50 *c* 70	55 *c* 75	76 *c* 93	50 *c* 65
March	50 *c* 75	55 *c* 75	76 *c* 93	60 *c* 70
April	50 *c* 75	60 *c* 80	76 *c* 93	55 *c* 66
May	45 *c* 70	55 *c* 75	75 *c* 90	60 *c* 75
June	45 *c* 65	55 *c* 75	80 *c* 95	58 *c* 75
July	45 *c* 65	60 *c* 80	80 *c* 95	50 *c* 75
August	50 *c* 65	65 *c* 87	72 *c* 80	50 *c* 75
September	50 *c* 65	75 *c* 90	72 *c* 80	50 *c* 75
October	50 *c* 70	75 *c* 90	65 *c* 73	50 *c* 75
November	50 *c* 70	75 *c* 90	66 *c* 75	50 *c* 75
December	52 *c* 72	65 *c* 85	50 *c* 70	50 *c* 75

	1844	1845	1846
	Rupees.	Rupees.	Rupees.
January	50 *c* 75	55 *c* 65	28 *c* 50
February	55 *c* 70	55 *c* 65	28 *c* 50
March	55 *c* 70	55 *c* 65	30 *c* 45
April	55 *c* 70	55 *c* 65	25 *c* 40
May	55 *c* 70	55 *c* 65	32 *c* 55
June	55 *c* 73	55 *c* 65	
July	55 *c* 65	52 *c* 70	
August	55 *c* 65	52 *c* 70	
September	55 *c* 65	52 *c* 70	
October	55 *c* 65	52 *c* 70	
November	55 *c* 65	40 *c* 60	
December	55 *c* 65	40 *c* 60	

27¼ Bazar Maunds = 1 Ton. 1 Bazar Maund = 82 lbs.

APPENDIX.

(No. 4.)

"ACCOUNT SALES"

Of 557 *Tons* (*as per Weight rendered per Clearance of Invoice*) *of Salt, received per* _____ *Captain* _____, *from Liverpool, by* MESSRS. AYLWIN AND CO., *of Calcutta, on account of* _____, *of Liverpool.*

	C. Rupees.	As.	P.	C. Rupees.	As.	P.
13,450 Bazar Maunds Stoved Square Salt, at 410 Company's Rupees per 100 Bazar Maunds				55,145	0	0
CHARGES:						
Duty, at 300 Company's Rupees per 100 Bazar Maunds, or 3 Rupees per Maund	40,350	0	0			
Cooley and Bhur hire, and landing above at Custom-house Godowns	195	12	0			
Weighing and Delivering	95	0	0			
Postages	4	8	0			
Commission 5 per cent., Del credere 2½ per cent., on 14,795 Company's Rupees, being value of Salt, less Duty paid	1,109	10	0			
				41,754	14	0
Net Proceeds, due 1st March, in Company's Rupees				13,390	2	0
Exchange at 2 shillings per Rupee £				1,339	0	3
Thus Netting per Ton, exclusive of Freight and Insurance, £				2	8	1

CALCUTTA,
1st March, 1846.

AYLWIN AND CO.

MEMORANDUM.

Loss in Weight, including that of Voyage and Landing, as well as Wastage in our Custom-house Godowns.

Weight, as per Invoice, 557 Tons, or	15,191	Bazar Maunds.
Ditto as per Account Sale	13,840	„ „
Loss in Weight	1,351	„ „

82 lbs. = 1 Maund. 1 Ton = 27¼ Maunds.

APPENDIX.

(No. 5)

IMPORTATION OF SALT ("PAYING DUTY") INTO CALCUTTA, IN BAZAR MAUNDS.

Compiled by Messrs. Aylwin & Co., Calcutta.

	1829-30	1830-31	1831-32	1832-33	1833-34
Great Britain	56	—	426½	729	7,949½
Bombay	2,730	5,355	5,664½	3,112	344
Gulphs	7,712	6,093	11,565	4,597	4,203
France	—	—	23½	—	—
Bazar Maunds	10,498	11,448	17,679½	8,438	12,496½

	1834-35	1835-36	1836-37	1837-38	1838-39
Great Britain	11,303	1,025	10,061	3,409	2,205¼
Gulphs	4,246	20,470	32,238	103,732	120,683
Bombay	1,696	268,076	306,120	178,967	72,459
Madras	—	214	3,550	—	—
France	—	—	1,500	20,900	9,414
China	—	—	898	494	—
Ceylon	—	—	—	9,913	—
Bourbon	—	—	—	—	2,748
Bazar Maunds	17,245	289,785	354,367	317,415	207,509¼

	1839-40	1840-41	1841-42	1842-43	1843-44	1844-45
Great Britain	2,616	5,937	83¾	9½	619	791¾
Bombay	209,250½	304,892¾	305,011¼	550,193	541,429	522,533
Gulphs	206,352½	229,824	189,450	213,804½	352,560	399,777
France	20,450	14,293	92,119	79,608	44,901¼	8,483
Madras	—	16,650½	4¼	—	—	—
Mauritius	—	12¾	500	4,823	—	1,272
Sydney	—	—	500	—	—	—
Ceylon	—	—	26,023	35,850	22,591	34,197
Bourbon	—	—	900	6,955	2,234	—
Pegu	—	—	—	1,184	2	—
Manilla	—	—	—	1,266	2,676	3,542
Bazar Maunds	438,669	571,310	614,591¼	893,892¾	967,012¼	970,595¾

1845-46.

		Gt. Britain.	Bombay.	Gulphs.	Red Sea.	Manilla.	France.	Madras.	Ceylon.	Mauritius.	Total.
1845.	May	—	59,350	908	—	—	—	—	10,000	—	70,258
	June	20	24,483	2,100	—	—	—	—	3,000	—	29,603
	July	—	16,023	—	38,950	—	—	—	4,200	—	59,173
	August	—	37,007	13,783	12,216	—	—	14,250	4,356	—	81,612
	September	16,559	65,130	8,500	26,653	—	—	15,636	—	—	132,478
	October	15,150	58,892	15,060	19,800	—	—	6,338	—	—	115,240
	November	54,991	11,739	23,151	44,633	—	—	13,014	13,750	—	161,278
	December	57,607	12,374	66,345	47,316	—	27,249	—	23,706	—	234,597
1846.	January	72,165	35,482	43,755	45,526	—	5,100	—	607	—	202,635
	February	50,388	30,610	1,112	33,364	—	7,603	—	—	—	123,077
	March	102,077	69,312	—	8,000	—	—	—	—	—	179,389
	April	133,657	57,142	—	1,000	—	—	—	—	—	191,799
Total		502,614	477,544	174,714	277,458		39,952	49,238	59,619		1,581,139

27¼ Bazar Maunds.=1 Ton.

N. B.—Indian Commercial Year commences on the 1st May.

APPENDIX.

(No. 6.)

VALUE OF AMOUNT OF TRADE (MERCHANDIZE) OF THE FOLLOWING COUNTRIES IN COMPANY'S RUPEES.

Compiled by Messrs. Aylwin and Company, of Calcutta.

IMPORTS.

	1829-30	1830-31	1831-32	1832-33	1833-34
Bombay . . . . . C. Rs.	603,440	559,860	510,119	792,430	723,750
Gulphs . } Red Sea } . . . . . ,,	484,350	511,431	489,080	328,050	439,462
France . . . . . ,,	1,465,391	749,040	357,843	796,283	1,004,133
Total . C. Rs.	2,553,181	1,820,331	1,347,042	1,916,763	2,257,345
Great Britain . . . ,,	16,125,841	20,073,354	17,372,762	14,026,707	13,991,801
Total . C. Rs.	18,679,022	21,893,685	18,729,804	16,943,470	16,249,146

	1834-35	1835-36	1836-37	1837-38	1838-39
Bombay . . . . . C. Rs.	1,378,714	2,481,949	2,369,801	1,709,377	819,557
Gulphs . } Red Sea } . . . . . ,,	270,726	543,874	490,457	859,420	842,248
France . . . . . ,,	769,255	1,007,199	1,260,544	1,037,911	608,949
Total . C. Rs.	2,418,695	4,033,022	4,120,802	3,606,708	2,270,754
Great Britain . . . ,,	14,757,957	18,248,186	22,404,707	20,528,327	21,341,243
Total . C. Rs.	17,176,652	22,281,208	26,525,509	24,135,035	23,611,997

	1839-40	1840-41	1841-42	1842-43	1843-44
Bombay . . . . . C. Rs.	1,975,683	1,649,498	1,434,739	1,816,245	1,720,116
Gulphs . } Red Sea } . . . . . ,,	1,251,119	789,540	722,781	621,672	750,426
France . . . . . C. Rs.	1,338,287	1,606,340	2,228,894	1,760,427	1,880,712
Total . C. Rs.	4,565,089	4,045,378	4,386,414	4,198,344	4,351,254
Great Britain . . . . ,,	25,962,488	37,757,049	33,069,120	30,809,451	34,950,727
Total . C. Rs.	30,527,577	41,802,427	37,455,534	35,007,795	39,301,981

	1844-45	1845-46
Bombay . . . . . C. Rs.	1,835,338	
Gulphs . } Red Sea } . . . . . ,,	911,803	
France . . . . . ,,	1,576,490	
Total . C. Rs.	4,323,631	
Great Britain . . . . ,,	48,625,096	
Total . C. Rs.	52,948,727	

APPENDIX.

(No. 7.)

STATEMENT SHEWING THE QUANTITY OF SALT, IN BAZAR MAUNDS, ACTUALLY CONSUMED IN EACH YEAR IN BENGAL, BEHAR, AND ORISSA, FROM 1790 TO 1840.

As also the Amount of Revenue that WOULD HAVE ACCRUED *supposing the Quantity had been Imported at a Fixed Duty 3 Rupees per Bazar Maund.*

Years.	Salt cleared from Sulkeah and Agency Golahs.	Salt sold by Retail in all Agencies, except Cuttack.	Salt sold by Retail in Cuttack.	Salt supplied to French Government.	Salt imported on which Duty was Paid.	TOTAL.	Revenue at 3 Rupees per Maund.
	Bazar Maunds.	Bazar Maunds.	Bazar Maunds.	Bazar Maunds.	Bazar Maunds.	Bazar Maunds.	Rupees.
1790-1	3,109,000	...	...	...	...	3,109,000	9,327,000
1791-2	3,015,735	...	...	...	...	3,015,735	9,047,205
1792-3	3,250,000	...	...	...	...	3,250,000	9,750,000
1793-4	3,566,231	...	...	...	...	3,566,231	10,698,693
1794-5	3,020,967	...	...	...	...	3,020,967	9,062,901
1795-6	3,777,957	1,029	...	...	...	3,778,986	11,336,958
1796-7	3,429,774	816*	...	...	...	3,430,590	10,291,770
1797-8	3,509,137	1,000	...	...	...	3,510,137	10,530,411
1798-9	3,234,662	658	...	...	...	3,235,320	9,705,960
1799-800	3,227,693	...	...	...	...	3,227,693	9,683,079
1800-1	3,244,945	510	...	...	...	3,245,455	9,736,365
1801-2	3,356,420	1,000	...	...	...	3,357,420	10,072,260
1802-3	3,520,302	1,402	...	...	...	3,521,704	10,565,112
1803-4	3,796,662	1,028	...	...	...	3,797,690	11,393,070
1804-5	3,890,900	1,200	...	...	...	3,892,100	11,676,300
1805-6	4,207,181	1,200	...	...	...	4,208,381	12,625,143
1806-7	4,155,178	1,200	142,442	...	...	4,298,820	12,896,460
1807-8	4,486,514	1,202	91,744	...	...	4,579,460	13,738,380
1808-9	4,222,250	1,060	115,550	...	...	4,338,860	13,016,580
1809-10	4,241,974	1,175	114,373	...	...	4,357,522	13,072,566
1810-1	4,421,117	1,275	117,514	...	...	4,539,906	13,619,718
1811-2	4,301,183	1,611	87,987	...	...	4,390,781	13,172,343
1812-3	4,550,298	1,903	135,212	...	...	4,687,413	14,062,239
1813-4	4,363,683	1,813	137,470	...	...	4,502,963	13,508,889
1814-5	4,312,741	1,220	149,539	...	...	4,463,500	13,390,500
1815-6	4,381,996	2,140	170,008	...	...	4,554,144	13,662,432
1816-7	4,626,578	1,310	132,777	...	...	4,760,665	14,281,995
1817-8	4,331,863	2,815	126,497	...	...	4,461,175	13,383,525
1818-9	4,641,102	1,981	216,405	12,000	...	4,871,488	14,614,464
1819-20	4,948,129	1,691	254,508	12,000	24,652	5,239,980	15,719,940
1820-1	4,622,279	1,214	251,986	...	13,740	4,888,219	14,664,657
1821-2	4,638,392	2,530	247,224	12,000	936	4,901,082	14,703,246
1822-3	4,591,678	3,743	276,026	12,000	11,889	4,895,336	14,686,008
1823-4	4,757,391	2,005	235,227	12,000	6,061	5,012,684	15,038,052
1824-5	5,134,460	2,810	296,031	9,000	3,518	5,445,819	16,337,457
1825-6	4,864,030	12,823	364,119	9,000	19,087	5,269,059	15,807,177
1826-7	4,501,716	84,837	338,973	12,000	9,117	4,915,643	14,746,929
1827-8	5,112,709	114,863	284,664	12,000	...	5,524,236	16,572,708
1828-9	4,449,506	67,936	277,700	12,000	10,538	4,817,680	14,453,040
1829-30	4,522,442	89,616	387,372	12,000	6,713	5,018,143	15,054,429
1830-1	4,721,627	145,219	375,515	12,000	14,537	5,268,898	15,806,694
1831-2	4,157,715	122,457	263,486	8,000	19,299	4,570,957	13,712,871
1832-3	4,148,597	138,407	293,213	11,000	10,293	4,601,510	13,804,530
1833-4	4,233,098	177,751	302,544	11,200	12,374	4,736,967	14,210,901
1834-5	4,081,666	193,324	321,614	14,000	10,518	4,621,122	13,863,366
1835-6	4,186,293	300,709	363,034	6,000	284,858	5,140,894	15,422,682
1836-7	3,897,993	361,490	303,682	14,000	355,527	4,932,692	14,798,076
1837-8	3,989,900	345,800	338,300	12,000	317,120	4,991,100	14,973,300
1838-9	4,333,700	459,200	342,000	14,000	198,340	5,333,200	15,999,600
1839-40	4,186,800	498,800	339,300	...	410,600	5,435,600	16,306,800
1840-1	4,045,096	499,224	331,206	...	921,798	5,797,324	17,391,972
1841-2	4,620,416	...	...	...	612,365	5,232,811	15,698,433
1842-3	4,313,289	...	...	...	892,735	5,206,024	15,618,072
1843-4	4,369,552	...	...	...	967,011	5,336,563	16,009,689
1844-5	4,644,046	...	...	...	970,594	5,614,640	16,843,920

* No perfect returns have been made for these years, of Salt sold by retail.

APPENDIX.

(No. 8.)

Statement comparing the "ACTUAL NET REVENUE" that has accrued to the East Indian Government from the manufacturing of Salt, with the difference as per Statement marked (No. 9), *there would have been, had the Revenue been derived from a Duty on imported Salt at the rate of three rupees per maund.*

Years.	Net Revenue *actually* derived.	Revenue *that would have* accrued, at 3 Rupees per Mnd.	Profit from Manufacturing.	Loss from Manufacturing.
	Rupees.	Rupees.	Rupees.	Rupees.
1793-4	8,067,817	10,698,697	—	2,630,876
1794-5	7,590,561	9,062,901	—	1,472,340
1795-6	7,380,741	11,336,958	—	3,956,217
1796-7	7,879,721	10,291,770	—	2,412,049
1797-8	7,359,265	10,530,411	—	3,171,146
1798-9	8,369,826	9,705,960	—	1,336,134
1799-800	7,950,900	9,683,079	—	1,732,179
1800-1	6,728,418	9,736,365	—	3,007,947
1801-2	6,999,175	10,072,260	—	3,073,085
1802-3	9,781,459	10,565,112	—	783,653
1803-4	12,199,390	11,393,070	806,320	—
1804-5	11,325,752	11,676,300	—	350,548
1805-6	10,613,883	12,625,143	—	2,011,260
1806-7	8,826,522	12,896,460	—	4,069,938
1807-8	12,307,359	13,738,380	—	1,431,021
1808-9	12,877,502	13,016,580	—	139,078
1809-10	10,621,655	13,072,566	—	2,150,911
1810-11	11,463,419	13,619,718	—	2,156,299
1811-12	11,353,394	13,172,343	—	1,818,949
1812-13	11,584,575	14,062,239	—	2,477,664
1813-14	12,196,084	13,508,889	—	1,312,805
1814-15	10,187,767	13,390,500	—	3,202,733
1815-16	8,834,568	13,662,432	—	4,827,864
1816-17	9,657,251	14,281,995	—	4,624,744
1817-18	10,466,030	13,383,525	—	2,917,495
1818-19	11,142,639	14,614,464	—	3,471,825
1819-20	11,707,352	15,719,940	—	4,012,588
1820-21	12,327,587	14,664,657	—	2,337,070
1821-22	14,097,387	14,703,246	—	605,859
1822-23	15,347,049	14,686,008	661,041	—
1823-24	12,947,397	15,038,052	—	2,090,655
1824-25	11,367,326	16,337,457	—	4,970,131
1825-26	11,346,825	15,807,177	—	4,460,352
1826-27	16,255,996	14,746,929	1,509,067	—
1827-28	19,545,602	16,572,708	2,972,894	—
1828-29	12,087,528	14,453,040	—	2,365,512
1829-30	13,157,071	15,054,429	—	1,897,358
1830-31	13,685,766	15,806,694	—	2,120,928
1831-32	13,755,517	13,712,871	42,646	—
1832-33	11,431,309	13,804,530	—	2,373,221
1833-34	11,555,074	14,210,901	—	2,655,827
1834-35	12,981,716	13,863,366	—	881,650
1835-36	13,490,643	15,422,682	—	1,932,039
1836-37	13,327,000	14,798,076	—	1,471,076
1837-38	13,241,000	14,973,300	—	1,732,300
1838-39	15,844,000	15,999,600	—	155,600
1839-40	14,528,000	16,306,800	—	1,778,800
1840-41	14,667,000	17,391,972	—	2,724,972
1841-42	13,906,000	15,698,433	—	1,792,433
1842-43	13,761,000	15,618,072	—	1,857,072
1843-44	12,759,462	16,009,689	—	3,250,227
1844-45	13,382,000	16,843,920	—	3,461,920
	606,268,280	712,042,662	5,991,968	111,766,350
Difference, and Total Loss by Manufacturing, in lieu of raising a Revenue by a Duty on the same quantity of Imported Salt at the rate of three Rupees per Maund . . .				5,991,968
				105,774,382
Equal in £ Sterling, Exchange at 2s. per Rupee . . . £				10,577,438

APPENDIX.

(No. 9.)

Statement of the Population in 1836, *as per Parliamentary Evidence, compared with estimated Census in* 1843-44, *allowing* 10 *per Cent. increase.*

	1835-36	1843-44
Districts subject to the monopoly, including countries supplied by retail, and not comprehended in the original limits of the monopoly; adding 16 per cent. for increase in the 13 years from 1823 to 1836	44,188,238	48,607,061
Districts supplied with salt imported by the western frontier of the Bengal Presidency including the British western provinces, the kingdom of Oude, the kingdom of Nepaul, &c., according to the estimate of Mr. Trevellian, in 1833 . . .	30,715,977	33,787,574
Madras territories, with increase at the rate of 16 per cent., from 1823 . . .	15,669,900	17,236,890
British territories under Bombay, with increase at the rate of 16 per cent., on the census taken between 1820 and 1828	7,251,793	7,976,972
Cessions on the Nerbuddah and by the Rajah of Berar, amounting to 85,700 square miles, and of which there is no census; but say at the rate of 100 persons to the square mile	8,570,000	9,427,000
A territory of 5500 square miles under Bombay, of which there is no census, but estimated as above	550,000	605,000
Tributary or independent States supplied with Salt through the British territories, exclusive of Oude and Nepaul, already given	26,000,000	28,600,000
Total Population	132,945,908	146,240,497

A. D.	Price of Salt.	Population.	Net Revenue from Salt.	Net Revenue per Head.
	Rupees.	No. of Souls.	£	Pence.
1793-94	302	24,000,000	806,781	8
1803-04	354	27,840,000	1,219,939	$10\frac{1}{2}$
1813-14	306	31,716,655	1,219,608	$9\frac{1}{4}$
1823-24	352	35,593,309	1,294,739	$8\frac{3}{4}$
1833-34	368	41,288,238	1,020,000	6
1843-44	392	48,607,061	1,275,946	$6\frac{1}{4}$

YEAR.	AREA.	POPULATION.		CONSUMPTION.	
		Absolute.	Relative.	Absolute.	Relative.
	Square Miles.		Per square Mile.	Lbs.	Lbs.
1793-94	144,762	24,000,000	165	286,054,440	12
1803-04	144,762	27,840,000	192	313,820,220	$11\frac{1}{2}$
1813-14	144,762	31,716,655	219	370,368,516	$11\frac{3}{4}$
1823-24	144,762	35,593,309	246	407,190,840	$11\frac{1}{2}$
1833-34	144,762	41,288,238	285	360,862,152	$8\frac{3}{4}$
1843-44	144,762	48,607,061	336	437,598,166	9

Statement showing Total Annual Consumption in Tons.

There should be of salt in the Bengal, Madras, and Bombay Presidencies, computing the population as above, say:—

Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.	
Districts subject to monopoly . 48,607,061	17,236,890	7,976,972	Territories under Bombay.
Ditto supplied with salt . . . 33,787,574		9,427,300	Cessions on the Nerbuddah.
Tributary or independent states 28,680,000		605,000	Territory of 5500 miles.
110,994,635		18,009,272	

Total Population, 146,240,497.

As well as the total annual consumption of all such countries in India as draw supplies from British sources, estimating the same at the average consumption of 25lbs. per head, as also 15lbs., 10lbs., and 5lbs. respectively:—

Estimated average consumption per head.	Consumption of Bengal, and districts drawing supplies thence.	Consumption of India, including Bengal.
lbs.	Tons.	Tons.
25	1,238,775	1,632,145
15	743,265	979,287
10	495,510	652,858
5	247,755	326,429

Whereas amount manufactured and sold by East India Company in Bengal does not average over 4,500,000 Maunds, equal to about 165,000 Tons. The remaining 950,000 Maunds being Imported Salt.

APPENDIX.

(No. 10.)

TOTAL VALUE OF MERCHANDISE AND TREASURE, IMPORTED INTO, AND EXPORTED AND RE-EXPORTED FROM, CALCUTTA, IN RUPEES.

IMPORTS.				EXPORTS.				
Years.	Merchandise.	Treasure.	Total.	Years.	Exports.	Re-Exports.	Treasure.	Total.
	Sicca Rupees.	Sicca Rupees.	Sicca Rupees.		Sicca Rupees.	Sicca Rupees.	Sicca Rupees.	Sicca Rupees.
1813-14	15,747,074	5,479,924	21,226,998	1813-14	33,269,555	2,228,133	42,750	35,540,438
1814-15	15,401,435	10,769,678	26,171,113	1814-15	38,530,539	2,332,188	154,625	41,017,352
1815-16	16,160,125	18,241,161	34,401,286	1815-16	47,263,665	2,708,701	15,750	49,988,116
1816-17	20,241,621	38,191,260	58,432,881	1816-17	52,161,770	2,825,358	169,000	55,156,128
1817-18	27,319,362	31,206,827	68,526,189	1817-18	51,111,850	3,845,293	317,250	55,274,393
1818-19	29,737,436	46,471,747	76,209,183	1818-19	46,327,353	4,161,009	288,539	50,776,901
1819-20	17,521,977	39,011,262	56,533,239	1819-20	49,549,846	4,781,459	6,647,505	60,978,810
1820-21	22,445,163	22,827,344	45,272,507	1820-21	53,410,669	3,392,579	1,229,363	58,032,611
1821-22	25,903,599	20,865,242	46,768,841	1821-22	49,637,503	3,915,620	12,396,395	65,949,518
1822-23	26,866,535	16,173,704	43,040,239	1822-23	56,240,698	5,610,782	5,151,966	67,003,446
1823-24	26,198,443	12,687,510	38,835,953	1823-24	46,580,663	3,984,629	12,233,039	62,798,331
1824-25	28,655,916	11,766,349	40,422,265	1824-25	49,601,729	3,014,626	3,491,676	56,108,031
1825-26	21,498,729	14,519,126	36,017,855	1825-26	52,654,998	3,984,924	138,704	56,778,626
1826-27	21,760,679	12,303,470	34,064,149	1826-27	48,678,605	2,547,714	1,115,032	52,341,351
1827-28	27,997,561	13,529,969	41,527,530	1827-28	56,535,033	2,992,071	4,480,987	64,008,091
1828-29	30,192,732	6,902,374	37,095,106	1828-29	47,441,528	2,840,431	1,763,193	52,045,152
1829-30	23,614,197	9,191,921	32,806,118	1829-30	31,918,479	2,275,129	1,640,321	35,833,929
1830-31	27,309,761	5,604,094	32,913,855	1830-31	33,182,961	2,855,900	3,311,136	39,349,997
1831-32	22,615,279	3,731,578	26,346,357	1831-32	32,803,132	2,558,292	4,056,612	39,418,036
1832-33	19,414,866	4,696,564	24,111,430	1832-33	34,256,099	2,312,804	5,897,067	42,465,970
1833-34	19,566,270	5,863,942	25,430,212	1833-34	38,072,512	2,384,692	2,425,727	42,882,931
1834-35	21,415,226	6,568,736½	27,983,962½	1834-35	39,664,141	2,215,540	430,186	42,309,867
	Company's Rupees.	Company's Rupees.	Company's Rupees.		Company's Rupees.	Company's Rupees.	Company's Rupees.	Company's Rupees.
1835-36	26,257,548	7,450,328	33,707,876	1835-36	59,239,197	2,620,476	412,789	62,272,462
1836-37	30,817,106	6,448,495	37,265,601	1836-37	63,525,281	3,222,587	329,541	67,077,409
1837-38	29,857,895	10,841,609	40,699,504	1837-38	61,479,472	3,249,599	316,888	65,045,959
1838-39	28,133,882	13,271,908	41,405,790	1838-39	61,025,616	3,497,588	277,601	64,800,805
1839-40	36,164,657	14,494,524	50,659,181	1839-40	66,381,495	3,815,867	208,757	70,406,119
1840-41	48,897,449	9,780,222	58,677,671	1840-41	78,355,905	4,475,332	862,061	83,693,298
1841-42	44,369,440	9,927,282	54,296,722	1841-42	79,150,782	4,367,955	421,855	83,940,592
1842-43	40,616,559	16,528,720	57,145,279	1842-43	72,677,205	3,734,119	109,841	76,521,165
1843-44	45,680,900	19,085,662	64,766,562	1843-44	97,655,973	3,227,350	287,947	101,171,270
1844-45	60,869,229	16,057,069	76,926,298	1844-45	96,077,561	4,324,917	2,915,434	103,317,912

(No. 11.)

RETURN *to an Order of the Honourable The House of Commons, dated* 29 *April*, 1846;—*for*,

A RETURN "*of the Quantity of* SALT *sent from* GREAT BRITAIN *to* FOREIGN COUNTRIES *in the Years* 1843, 1844, *and* 1845, *specifying the Ports whence Exported, and the Places where Imported.*"

QUANTITY of BRITISH SALT EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM.

PORTS FROM WHICH EXPORTED.	1843.			1844.			1845.		
	Rock Salt.	White Salt.	Total.	Rock Salt.	White Salt.	Total.	Rock Salt.	White Salt.	Total.
	Bushels.	Bushels.	Bushels.	Bushels.	Bushels.	Bushels.	Bushels.	Bushels.	Bushels.
London	3,930	58,840	62,770	1,991	92,473	94,464	10,980	259,812	270,792
Southampton	—	—	—	—	600	600	—	—	—
Cowes	—	2,000	2,000	—	—	—	—	—	—
Poole	—	3,800	3,800	—	2,000	2,000	—	12,540	12,540
Bristol	—	91,244	91,244	696	66,362	67,058	578	200,684	201,262
Gloucester	—	273,560	273,560	—	578,240	578,240	—	495,140	495,140
Beaumaris	—	11,860	11,860	—	—	—	—	800	800
Chester	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	7,200	7,200
Liverpool	1,784,564	10,408,571	12,193,135	2,102,513	10,009,969	12,112,482	2,597,936	10,289,310	12,887,246
Hull	11,495	38,850	50,345	22,890	237,106	259,996	36,198	159,808	197,006
Goole	—	—	—	—	8,280	8,280	—	—	—
Grimsby	—	—	—	—	5,040	5,040	—	—	—
Other Ports of England	—	5,946	5,946	3	622	625	—	2,007	2,007
Ports of Scotland	1,849	9,960	11,809	409	8,268	8,677	6,810	14,058	20,868
Ports of Ireland	400	239,584	239,984	3,120	273,302	276,422	900	224,721	225,621
Total	1,802,238	11,144,215	12,946,453	2,131,622	11,282,262	13,413,884	2,653,402	11,666,080	14,319,482
COUNTRIES TO WHICH EXPORTED.									
Russia	17,260	1,809,920	1,827,180	31,320	1,792,436	1,823,756	66,640	1,717,500	1,784,140
Sweden	4,000	42,480	46,480	5,000	34,350	39,350	1,912	96,480	98,392
Norway	81,280	154,087	235,367	20,160	178,084	198,244	30,420	196,059	226,479
Denmark	27,020	213,340	240,360	104,940	357,636	462,576	161,566	399,743	561,309
Prussia	14,975	1,226,260	1,241,235	30,320	1,656,200	1,686,520	4,840	1,565,161	1,570,001
Germany	63,120	205,118	268,238	65,960	235,466	301,426	70,200	197,472	267,672
Holland	829,640	35,740	865,380	799,770	32	799,802	1,188,820	—	1,188,820
Belgium	723,440	214	723,654	1,041,390	38	1,041,428	1,027,160	506	1,027,666
Western Coast of Africa	—	420,711	420,711	3,480	370,972	374,452	—	357,444	357,444
Cape of Good Hope	240	23,041	23,281	1,313	41,658	42,971	600	18,562	19,162
Mauritius	—	4,050	4,050	—	4,766	4,766	—	14,580	14,580
East India Company's Territories and Ceylon	3	962	965	—	3,593	3,593	18,480	892,412	910,892
China	—	—	—	—	40	40	—	30,028	30,028
British Settlements in Australia	2,030	72,672	74,702	1,600	124,201	125,801	37,694	295,901	333,595
British North American Colonies	16,127	1,429,193	1,445,320	13,280	1,759,519	1,772,799	17,680	1,343,444	1,361,124
British West Indies	4,091	56,196	60,287	3,766	50,660	54,426	5,070	84,955	90,025
Foreign West Indies	—	27,400	27,400	—	19,340	19,340	—	28,400	28,400
United States of America	8,800	5,311,208	5,320,008	2,400	4,599,030	4,601,430	7,800	4,334,969	4,342,769
Mexico and States of South America	—	18,834	18,834	800	4,518	5,318	—	23,381	23,381
Channel Islands	—	91,580	91,580	120	40,912	41,032	200	65,740	65,940
All other Parts	10,212	1,209	11,421	6,003	8,811	14,814	14,320	3,343	17,663
Total	1,802,238	11,144,215	12,946,453	2,131,622	11,282,262	13,413,884	2,653,402	11,666,080	14,319,482

Office of the Inspector-General of Imports and Exports, Custom-House, London, 6 May, 1846.

1 Bushel=56 lbs. or ½ cwt. 40 Bushels=1 Ton.

WILLIAM IRVING.

(No. 12.)

SHIPPING.

NUMBER OF SHIPS AND AMOUNT OF TONNAGE ENTERED INWARDS AT THE PORT OF CALCUTTA.

TOTAL IMPORT TONNAGE INTO CALCUTTA.

Years.	Ships.	Tons.	Years.	Ships.	Tons.	Years.	Ships.	Tons.	Years.	Ships.	Tons.
1793-4	none	none	1802-3	215	81,293	1811-12	225	87,124	1820-21	261	104,932
1794-5	"	"	1803-4	177	65,027	1813-13	226	84,228	1821-22	261	102,864
1795-6	170	57,696	1804-5	185	69,557	1813-14	222	77,192	1822-23	286	116,641
1796-7	172	63,924	1805-6	210	82,814	1814-15	200	68,928	1823-24	228	87,524
1797-8	139	52,464	1806-7	245	92,632	1815-16	291	94,966	1824-25	274	111,841
1798-9	121	43,349	1807-8	194	72,544	1816-17	369	142,606	1825-26	244	97,281
1799-800	145	47,403	1808-9	151	50,545	1817-18	428	161,346	1826-27	245	97,067
1800-1	170	54,759	1809-10	168	63,151	1818-19	395	157,441	1827-28	304	111,253
1801-2	153	52,944	1810-11	200	69,179	1819-20	273	103,553			

BRITISH IMPORTS.	1828-29		1829-30		1830-31		1831-32		1832-33		1833-34		1834-35		1835-36		1836-37	
	Ships.	Tonnage.	Ships.	Tonnage.	Ships.	Tonnage.	Ships.	Tonnage.	Ships.	Tonnage.	Ships.	Tonnage.	Ships.	Tonnage.	Ships.	Tonnage.	Ships.	Tonnage.
Hon. Company's Regular Ships	12	15,338	11	13,416	4	5,624	7	8,799	7	9,383	8	10,587	—	—	—	—	—	—
Hon. Company's Chartered ditto	11	6,648	5	2,955	11	5,942	5	2,988	7	3,543	9	5,106	1	729	—	—	—	—
Ships from United Kingdom	90	37,429	66	27,388	66	28,921	65	29,198	77	33,579	95	38,297	94	45,036	81	41,912	128	70,691
ditto Foreign Europe	7	1,324	1	262	1	147	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	266	—	—	1	227
ditto South America	1	216	—	—	1	472	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
ditto Asiatic Ports	113	36,505	104	32,510	107	32,346	122	33,608	137	39,264	158	46,050	74	56,399	144	39,234	213	51,059
Arabs, Turkish, and Dhonies	44	8,844	58	10,075	112	13,910	97	12,457	63	8,270	182	25,487	93	13,485	52	3,991	20	1,654
Vessels laden with Coast Salt	107	10,824	84	8,252	95	9,255	94	8,722	153	15,529	219	35,793	227	30,487	141	31,719	167	19,737
Ditto in Ballast	14	4,866	8	1,444	19	6,044	9	2,647	4	1,389	11	3,486	22	6,189	15	4,856	37	17,553
Chinese and Burmese Junks	1	70	1	90	4	665	—	—	—	—	2	490	4	398	—	—	—	—
Total	400	122,564	338	96,332	420	103,320	399	88,419	448	110,567	784	165,296	616	152,989	433	121,712	586	160,921
FOREIGN IMPORTS.																		
From Foreign Europe	28	8,955	21	7,321	23	7,485	11	4,327	15	4,942	23	7,708	19	6,566	14	4,607	15	4,955
From North America	12	3,806	14	4,244	21	6,439	20	5,870	15	4,484	22	7,353	13	4,352	27	9,838	26	9,676
From Brazil	1	241	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	226
From Asiatic Ports	5	1,360	9	2,075	14	4,006	7	1,862	8	2,894	9	3,131	7	2,217	38	10,956	53	16,454
In Ballast and Treasure	—	—	1	171	9	2,502	1	376	—	—	3	992	2	407	10	2,984	17	5,179
Total	46	14,362	45	13,811	67	20,432	39	12,235	38	12,320	57	19,184	41	13,542	89	28,385	111	36,264
Grand Total	446	136,926	383	110,143	487	123,752	438	100,645	486	122,887	841	184,480	657	166,531	522	150,097	697	197,185

BRITISH IMPORTS.	1837-38		1838-39		1839-40		1840-41		1841-42		1842-43		1843-44		1844-45		1845-46		1846-47	
	Ships.	Tonnage.	Ships.	Tonnage.	Ships.	Tonnage.	Ships.	Tonnage.	Ships.	Tonnage.	Ships.	Tonnage.	Ships.	Tonnage.	Ships.	Tonnage.	Ships.	Tonnage.	Ships.	Tonnage.
From the United Kingdom direct, and via Cape and Madras	123	55,132	155	65,028	137	67,285	198	91,403	250	111,148	174	89,235	199	77,172	222	106,390				
Foreign Europe	—	—	1	373	3	1,051	5	1,776	14	3,447	14	3,841	6	1,914	9	2,359				
South America	2	913	1	313	—	—	—	—	1	233	—	—	1	235	1	185				
West Indies (Demerara)	—	—	1	249	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	223	—	—				
Cape of Good Hope	1	247	5	1,648	17	4,698	8	2,059	5	1,837	1	290	5	1,102	—	—				
Madeira	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	567	—	—	—	—	—	—				
Mauritius and Bourbon	56	18,417	55	17,976	46	13,922	65	21,042	71	23,949	29	10,257	72	21,586	48	21,074				
Arabian and Persian Gulphs	12	5,122	10	4,057	13	5,923	12	5,114	11	5,206	13	8,545	25	12,074	18	11,065				
Ceylon	5	1,111	1	238	4	816	3	518	7	1,921	9	3,885	5	1,411	14	5,067				
Australia	11	3,877	19	7,500	34	10,725	45	20,345	60	24,467	9	3,303	18	2,721	2	1,131				
China and Singapore	33	14,935	32	11,538	27	9,380	30	8,472	53	21,393	88	39,150	51	20,219	46	17,343				
Penang, Malacca and Singapore	34	6,851	24	5,101	40	8,261	62	14,288	54	14,448	31	8,754	32	8,855	32	8,696				
Pegu, Moulmein and Rangoon	42	7,674	58	14,528	67	16,320	49	8,227	56	16,162	25	5,018	42	9,690	37	8,107				
Bombay and Malabar Coast	19	6,955	18	6,775	33	13,304	42	19,752	33	14,897	49	27,355	58	33,265	61	27,879				
Madras and Coromandel Coast	12	4,732	22	6,955	23	7,711	21	5,467	22	6,899	25	8,338	22	7,976	32	11,114				
North America	1	646	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	407	—	—	—	—	—	—				
Sandoway, Khyouk Phyoo, Chittagong	2	400	6	1,893	—	—	3	608	2	1,116	7	2,226	—	—	10	1,353				
Sumatra and Batavia	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	209	3	1,102	—	—	—	—	1	229				
Dhonies from the Coromandel Coast, called Chollahs and Telingahs	51	4,796	69	6,915	39	3,363	41	4,023	184	13,659	103	9,375	187	16,595	47	4,043				
" Laccadives and Ceylon	8	560	7	670	10	872	8	550	12	802	—	—	10	837	8	794				
" Balasore and Cuttack	97	4,888	206	6,940	13	775	5	203	74	3,469	242	11,116	308	15,430	345	15,192				
Junks from Mergui and Rangoon	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	171	3	136	3	190	1	65	1	110				
Total	509	137,143	670	160,391	496	184,404	599	204,227	887	267,638	823	231,405	999	239,068	935	241,592				
FOREIGN IMPORTS.																				
From Foreign Europe (France, &c.)	13	5,937	21	6,669	20	6,206	14	4,049	26	8,144	21	6,346	18	6,343	28	9,886				
America (United States)	13	4,559	18	6,674	22	9,160	30	7,282	27	12,368	16	7,630	15	6,899	18	8,083				
Bremen vessels from Bremen	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	180	1	180	1	180	—	—	—	—				
Foreign vessels from China & Singapore	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	209	—	—	3	1,066				
Portuguese vessels from Rangoon	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	209	1	457				
Mauritius and Bourbon	26	8,772	29	9,296	31	9,052	23	6,856	20	7,332	23	7,229	29	7,955	20	5,618				
Arabian and Persian Gulphs	8	3,719	12	5,748	9	4,318	12	5,008	12	5,445	12	5,404	20	4,816	12	5,614				
Malayan vessels from Penang	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	8	558	—	—	—	—				
French vessels from Rangoon	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	279	4	647	—	—	2	673	—	—				
Java and Sumatra	4	1,053	1	300	8	2,095	9	2,416	5	1,592	5	1,244	5	1,853	—	—				
Burmese vessels from Rangoon	1	170	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	494	1	150				
Sardinian vessels from Genoa	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	277	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—				
Madras	1	334	—	—	2	760	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—				
Dhonies from the Maldive Islands	10	1,170	11	1,585	15	1,431	14	1,345	14	1,561	14	1,452	11	1,035	13	1,379				
Tavoy and Mergui	8	560	3	230	4	720	—	—	1	70	—	—	—	—	—	—				
Penang, Batavia, &c. (Dutch)	—	—	5	1,256	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	1,722				
Manilla Spanish	—	—	—	—	1	100	1	280	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—				
American vessels from Macao	—	—	—	—	1	598	2	1,219	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	372				
Ditto from Batavia	—	—	1	339	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—				
Ditto	1	262	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—				
Total	87	26,547	101	31,917	111	34,444	98	30,089	114	37,339	96	30,252	94	30,168	103	34,347				
Grand Total	596	163,690	771	192,308	607	198,848	697	234,316	1,001	304,977	919	261,657	1,084	269,236	1,038	275,939				

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